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THE YEMENI REVOLUTION 1962-1967 AND SAUDI ARABIA'S ROLE: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY

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ABSTRACT

This study aims at shedding light on the Saudi position on the Yemeni revolution on Sep 26, 1962, its role in supporting the royal side, and its reasons to stand next to leadership (Imamate) to restore the throne. The study also aims at highlighting the most important conferences that were held to end up the Yemeni crisis and the conditions they put to support the royal side. Moreover, it explains the alliance between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as Britain and Saudi Arabia, and the attempts to gain support from the United States of America. The study tackles the Yemeni and Saudi relations before 1962 and the Saudi position on the Yemeni revolution; also, it discusses the Yemeni support after the Egyptian military interference, the conversations with America, the alliance between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and the Saudi role in making peace and searching for the settlement of Yemen.

KEYWORDS: Yemeni Revolution, Saudi Arabia, Crisis.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Saudi-Yemeni War of 1934 had a significant impact on the development of relations between the two sister Arab states (Yemen and Saudi Arabia). This war ended with the signing of a treaty known as the Treaty of Taif in 1934¹. This treaty established fixed principles for demarcating borders between the two states, avoiding any future border clashes, in addition to consolidating relations between them. This treaty was not merely a peace treaty, but it precisely regulated relations between the two parties, and both states knew, as the treaty shows, that each party shared common political interests². Following this treaty, a degree of political stability emerged that enabled Imam Yahya³ to secure his northern borders with the strongest state in the Arabian Peninsula at the time. The Saudi regime realized that any event in Yemen would directly affect it, positively or negatively. Therefore, Saudi Arabia had to intervene in some of Yemen's internal affairs. Relations between the two countries after that treaty were characterized at times by tension and at other times

by tranquility.

We find that after the coup of Abdullah al-Wazir⁴ in 1948 in Yemen, Abdullah al-Wazir requested external support from some Arab states, especially from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he sent a delegation to Saudi Arabia to obtain military and financial support, as well as recognition of him as the new ruler of Yemen. It is noted that King Abdulaziz⁵ did not respond to the message sent to him by Abdullah al-Wazir for rapprochement, nor did the Saudi government officially receive the Yemeni delegation at the time. This was perhaps due to fear of the spread of revolutionary Yemeni ideas that would affect not only Yemen but could also encompass Arab states at the time⁶.

Some sources mention that King Abdulaziz discussed with the delegation members the nature of the coup, its goals, its plans, and the future political situation of Yemen, but then he gave them a harsh response, reminding them of the treaty he concluded with Imam Yahya (in Taif), and then expelled them from Saudi Arabia⁷.

As for the Arab League⁸, it sent a delegation

1 Treaty of Taif: It is a treaty concluded between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Mutawakkil Kingdom of Yemen on May 19, 1934 AD. This treaty ended the border disputes between the two parties, and it occurred due to the two countries' disagreement over some border areas, in addition to many outstanding issues that arose due to crossing borders and conflicts of interests. This treaty is considered a direct result of the war that took place between the two countries for seven years. For more information about the Yemeni-Saudi war and the Treaty of Taif, see: Salem, Al-Sayyid Mustafa, *The Formation of Modern Yemen*, Dar Al-Amin, Cairo, 4th edition, 1993 AD, pp. 381-428. It will later be referred to as: Salem, the formation of modern Yemen.

2 Salem, *The Formation of Modern Yemen*, pp. 425-427.

3 Imam Yahya (1869-1948 AD): Imam Yahya was born in Al-Hamimah on June 25, 1869 AD. Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid al-Din grew up in Sana'a, under the care of his father, memorizing and sealing the Qur'an. When Imam al-Mansur Billah died in 1908 AD, the senior scholars of Sana'a gathered to pledge allegiance to his son, Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din, but he initially refused to take charge of the Muslims and wanted them to choose someone. Others, but they insisted on pledging allegiance to him, so he agreed to the pledge of allegiance on September 1, 1908, and he was nicknamed (the one who trusts in God), and after that all the people of the country pledged allegiance to him, and he became a Zaidi imam ruling over Yemen, and he died after the 1948 coup. Mutahar, Abd al-Karim bin Ahmad, *Biography of Imam Yahya bin Muhammad*, Part 1, edited by Muhammad Issa Salihyah, Dar al-Bashir, Amman, 1st edition, 1998 AD, pp. 11-15. It will later be referred to as: Mutahhar, *Biography of the Imamate*.

4 Abdullah Al-Wazir (1889-1948 AD): Abdullah bin Ahmed bin Muhammad Al-Wazir was born in Sana'a in the year 1889 AD. He is an administrative and political scholar. He studied at the hands of the sheikhs of Sana'a. After the death of his mother, Imam Yahya appointed him governor of the Dhamar district, after which he appointed him to command the army. He played an important role in the Yemeni-Saudi talks, and was able to sign the Taif Agreement in 1934 AD. He became the Imam's advisor, and when Imam Yahya was assassinated, he declared the Constitutional Revolution in 1934. 1948 AD, and he was chosen as an imam. After the failure of the revolution, he was imprisoned in the city of Hajjah and executed there. He was the first martyr of the revolution.

5 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud (1880 - 1953 AD): He was born in Riyadh on December 8, 1880 AD. His father was the prince of parts of Najd. He was the founder of the Third Saudi State in 1932 AD after he was able to control Riyadh, Hail, the Hijaz and Asir and extend his control over Najd with the exception of Jabal Shammar. Abdul Aziz sought to improve his relations with the neighboring Arab countries and obtain their recognition of the borders of his kingdom. He died in November 9, 1953 AD in Taif, Abdul Aziz gave birth to 34 sons (prince), of whom six took over the kingship after him until today: Saud, Faisal, Khaled, Fahd, Abdullah, and Salman. For more, see: Muhafaza, Ali, *Personalities from History*, Arab Foundation for Studies and Publishing, Beirut, 2nd edition, 2012, pp. 77-82. Hereafter referred to as: Governorate, *Personalities*.

6 A group of Soviet authors, *Contemporary History of Yemen 1917-1982 AD*, translated by Muhammad Ali Al-Bahr, edited by Muhammad Ahmed Ali, Madbouly Library, Cairo, 1st edition, 1990 AD, p. 85. Later referred to as: Soviet, *contemporary Yemen*; Salem, *The Formation of Modern Yemen*, p. 500.

7 Prepared by the National Book Committee, *Yemen Revolution and Peace*, National House, Yemen, DT, p. 37. It will later be referred to as: National House, *Revolution and Peace*.

8 League of Arab States: It is an Arab organization that appeared in 1945 AD after the failure of all unitary projects. It aims to strengthen political, economic, cultural and social ties, and coordinate cooperation between Arab countries. The League Council is the highest authority in the League, and it includes independent Arab countries, and its headquarters is in Cairo. For more information, see: Abdel Moneim, Ahmed Fares, *The League of Arab States, 1945-1948 AD*, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1st edition, 1986 AD, pp. 12-17. He will later be referred to as: Abdel Moneim, *League of Arab States*.

following the 1948 coup in Yemen to determine its stance on what was happening there. King Abdulaziz received them and advised them not to go to Yemen due to the instability there and because Sana'a airport had been destroyed⁹. Prince Ahmed bin Yahya (1891 – 1962) had contacted King Abdulaziz requesting his support and backing. He headed to Saudi Arabia, and on his way there, he sent a telegram stating he was heading to Ibn Saud. Prince Ahmed met with Ibn Saud, consulted him on how to quell the revolution and requested his support. Saudi Arabia's response was to support him with thousands of Riyals, weapons, and political support¹⁰. Prince Ahmed also contacted King Farouk (1920 – 1965)¹¹ and explained to him the importance of the continuation of Imamate rule in Yemen. The Iraqi government declared mourning for the death of Imam Yahya and requested the Arab League to boycott Abdullah al-Wazir. Ibn Saud also requested the Arab League not to recognize Abdullah al-Wazir's government, explaining to them the danger of this movement to the security of the Arabian Peninsula. With the end of the revolution and the capture of Abdullah al-Wazir, Ibn Saud sent a message to Imam Ahmed congratulating him on quelling the revolution and requesting him to deal harshly with the prisoners¹².

We can say that Ibn Saud's request to Imam Ahmed to deal harshly with the prisoners of the revolution was so that they would serve as a lesson to anyone tempted to carry out such actions, or to

anyone harboring revolutionary ideas that could shake the security and stability of the Arabian Peninsula.

An atmosphere of cordiality prevailed in Saudi-Yemeni relations during the rule of Imam Ahmed bin Yahya, until a new coup attempt occurred in 1955, but it was from within the Imam's own family. Its goal was to overthrow Imam Ahmed, not to topple the ruling family, and to replace Imam Ahmed with his brother Prince Abdullah¹³. Imam Ahmed had no choice but to sign the document of abdication. His Crown Prince, Prince Al-Badr, moved politically to reclaim his father's throne. He then sent a delegation to Saudi Arabia to support him militarily and materially to face the coup of his uncle Abdullah and Colonel Ahmed al-Thalaya¹⁴. Ibn Saud resolved to support Imam Ahmed and his crown prince. However, these aids did not reach Yemen, because Imam Ahmed managed to quell his brother's coup and restore matters to their previous state, returning as the legitimate Imam of Yemen¹⁵.

We observe from the above that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both leadership and people, was keen to preserve the ruling system in Yemen and always extended material assistance to achieve that, as this preserved the security and stability of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Imam Ahmed visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the two parties signed the alliance agreement in Jeddah in 1956¹⁶. Imam Ahmed

9 National House, *Revolution and Peace*, p. 37; Salem, *The Formation of Modern Yemen*, p. 501.

10 National House, *Revolution and Peace*, pp. 37-38.

11 King Farouk (1920 - 1965 AD): He is Farouk bin Ahmed Fouad bin Ismail Al-Khedive bin Ibrahim bin Muhammad Ali, the last to rule Egypt from the family of Muhammad Ali Pasha. He was born in Cairo, educated there, and traveled to France and Britain to complete his education. He succeeded his father as king of Egypt in 1936 AD, and the 1952 revolution forced him to depose himself, so he abdicated the throne to his child son, Ahmed Fouad II, who soon died. Deposed by turning Egypt into a republic, Farouk resided in Rome - the Italian capital - and sometimes moved to Switzerland and France until he died in the city of Rome, and he had recommended that he be buried in Medina. See: Al-Zirakli, Khair al-Din, *Al-A'lam*, a dictionary of biographies of the most famous men and women from the Arabs, the Arabs, and the Orientals, vol. 5, Dar Al-Ilm Lil-Malayin, Beirut, 7th edition, 1986 AD, pp. 128-129. It will later be referred to as: Al-Zirakli, Al-A'lam.

12 National House, *Revolution and Peace*, pp. 37-38.

13 Prince Abdullah (1913-1955 AD): He is Abdullah bin Yahya bin Muhammad Hamid al-Din, a prince, politician, imam, and the seventh son of Imam Yahya. He was familiar with the culture of the era. He held the Ministry of Education during the reign of his father, then he was appointed Emir of the Hodeidah District in 1932 AD. Like his father when the League of Arab States was founded in 1945 AD, his brother Imam Ahmed appointed him Minister of Foreign Affairs and continued in his position until he declared himself an Imam in a coup. 1955 AD, after the failure of the coup, his brother Imam Ahmed ordered his execution. Afif, *Yemeni Encyclopedia*, pp. 1210-1211.

14 Ahmed Al-Thalaya (1918-1955 AD): He is Ahmed bin Yahya Al-Thalaya, born in 1918 AD, leader of the 1955 movement and one of its martyrs. He was born and raised in Sana'a, strong in body, smiling a lot, keen on order. He studied in an orphanage, then joined the army, traveled with a mission to Iraq, and was an army trainer. He was appointed Emir of the detachment in Saada, and supported the 1948 revolution, when the revolution failed, so he fled, then he was imprisoned in Sanaa. He was liberated, remained under surveillance, and participated with a group of people to assassinate Imam Ahmed, but the attempt failed. Then he led the 1955 AD movement against Imam Ahmed in order for him to abdicate the throne to his brother, but he failed to do so, and he was executed by order of Imam Ahmed. For more, see: Afif, *Yemeni Encyclopedia*, pp. 789-791.

15 Badeeb, Saeed Muhammad, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen (1962-1970 AD)*, Dar Al-Saqi, Beirut, 1st edition, 1990 AD, pp. 36-38. It will later be referred to as: Badeeb, the Saudi-Egyptian conflict.

16 Treaty of Jeddah: It is a military alliance between Yemen, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, concluded on April 20, 1956 AD in the city of Jeddah. The alliance was the result of a race between Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Baghdad Pact to win Yemen and Saudi Arabia and annex them to it. President Abdel Nasser succeeded in convincing Imam Ahmed and King Saud to conclude a defensive military alliance with him, and Imam Ahmed agreed in order to win President Gamal Abdel Nasser to his side, but King Saud agreed. Upon joining the alliance as a result

appointed the first ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Yemeni soil in the same year. Relations between the two parties were managed through sending temporary missions with specific tasks. Relations continued to improve between the two countries until Yemen joined the United Arab Republic in 1958. Ibn Saud tried to convince Imam Ahmed to retract the decision to join, but he insisted on his decision to avoid the criticism of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918 – 1970)¹⁷. Matters deteriorated further between the two parties after Imam Ahmed strengthened relations with the Soviet Union, upon a request from the Egyptian president. However, he quickly returned to his Saudi ally after the collapse of the United Arab Republic¹⁸ between Egypt and Syria in 1961¹⁹.

Despite Yemen's accession to the United Arab Republic, Imam Ahmed assured King Ibn Saud that the main reason behind Yemen's accession to the United Arab Republic was to avoid the criticisms, slogans, and propaganda of Gamal Abdel Nasser. After Syria's withdrawal from the union in September 1961, Imam Ahmed indirectly criticized Gamal Abdel Nasser's policies. Gamal Abdel Nasser's response was to completely end the union with Yemen on September 27, 1961²⁰.

The Outbreak of the September 26, 1962 Revolution

Imam Al-Badr assumed power on September 19,

1962. He began his rule by presenting a program to reform the country, guaranteeing citizens' rights and abolishing the hostage system. He released a large number of politicians, appointed himself as Prime Minister, and began forming a Consultative Council²¹. He appointed half of the members of the Consultative Council²² and appointed himself as head of government. He began breaking the policy of isolation by extending a hand of friendship to all countries wishing to strengthen relations with Yemen. He also wanted his state to become an official member of the Non-Aligned Movement²³. He moved the capital from Ta'izz to Sana'a²⁴.

On September 22, 1962, Imam Al-Badr delivered a political speech containing the outlines of his new policies²⁵, after Friday prayers²⁶. Al-Badr's policies did not differ from the policies of Imams Yahya and Ahmed. His speech was disappointing, as the Yemeni people were expecting more than that. The sons of Yemen from various regions gathered, and the sheikhs and leaders demanded the establishment of projects and infrastructure serving Yemen, such as: road construction, building health facilities, and establishing new schools. Imam Al-Badr looked at the sheikhs' demands with scorn and threatened them with the severest punishments if they tried to interfere with the ruling system or its policies. This ignited in their hearts the fire of revolution and change. Imam Al-Badr issued a decision in the

of the hostility between the Al Saud family and the Hashemite family that rules Iraq, King Saud sought to extend his hand to President Gamal Abdel Nasser to strengthen his Hashemite opponents. For more information, see: Al-Eryabi, Abd al-Rahman bin Yahya, *Memoirs of President Judge Abd al-Rahman bin Yahya al-Eryabi 1910-1962 AD*, Part 1, Dar al-Kutub in Sana'a, Yemen, 2012 AD, pp. 251-253. It will later be referred to as: Al-Eryabi, *Memoirs*.

17 Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970 AD): Born on January 15, 1918 AD in Alexandria, he is the second president of Egypt. He held power from 1956 until his death. He was one of the leaders of the July 23, 1952 revolution that overthrew King Farouk, and he served as deputy prime minister in its new government. Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power, and after President Mohamed Naguib was placed under house arrest; Due to growing differences between Naguib and the Revolutionary Command Council, he became President of the Republic on June 25, 1956 AD, according to the referendum held on June 23, 1956 AD. Gamal Abdel Nasser died on September 28, 1970 AD, at the age of 52 years. For more information about Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, see: Kamel, Gamal, *Gamal Abdel Nasser, Love, Bread, and Revolution*, Dar Al-Awda, Lebanon, 1st edition, 1974 AD. It will later be referred to as: Kamel, *Love, Bread, and Revolution*.

18 For more information about the United Arab Republic, see: Harfouche, Iyad, *The United Arab Republic: The Realities of Unity and Separation*, Dar Orouba, D. M., 1st edition, 2014 AD, p. 21 et seq.

19 Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, p. 38.

20 Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, p. 13.

21 Ingrams, Harold, *Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions*, translated by Najib Saeed Bawazir, Center for Yemeni Research and Studies, University of Aden, 1st edition, 2007, pp. 116-117. It will later be referred to as: Ingrams, *Yemen Imams*.

22 Al-Difaa, Jerusalem, No. 8110, September 20, 1962, p. 4.

23 Non-alignment: A political position adopted by Third World countries that saw no inclination towards either of the Eastern blocs led by the Soviet Union and the Western blocs led by the United States of America. Fearing that it would be afflicted by the scourge of war if it followed one of the two countries, not having military or political ties with one of the two blocs, not taking or following any policy that might lead to bias, refusing to establish military bases for one of the two blocs, and canceling all military treaties, the movement was established in 1955 AD at the Bandung Conference. For more information, see: Meziane, Amina, Didawi, Jamila, *The Non-Aligned Movement through the Belgrade 1961 and Cairo 1964 Conferences*, Master's thesis, unpublished, Djilali Bounaama University Khamis Miliana, 2017, p. 13. It will later be referred to as: Meziane, *Non-Aligned Movement*.

24 Opalance, *Revolution and War*, pp. 18-19; Al-Salumi, Yemen, p. 27.

25 Al-Thawr, *The Yemen Revolution*, pp. 132-133; Al-Oqab, Abdul-Wahhab Adam, *The Unity of Yemen*, a documentary study in the contemporary history of Yemen from the period of the Imamate of Ali to the contemporary history of Yemen, Raslan House and Foundation, Damascus, 1st edition, 2010 AD, p. 39. It will later be referred to as: Al-Oqab, *Unity of Yemen*.

26 Al-Thawr, *The Yemen Revolution*, p. 132.

Council of Ministers on the evening of September 25, 1962, involving the withdrawal of all weapons from army barracks and the closure of all military schools²⁷.

Perhaps this policy represented in the Imam's speech played a role in the September 26, 1962 revolution, which differed from the revolutions and movements that preceded it in terms of planning, execution, and goals. The Free Officers Organization, which was established in Yemen in 1961²⁸, tried to prepare a tight plan to achieve a complete victory over the Imamate system. There were some obstacles facing the organization, such as: the limited capabilities of the organization, the fact that the Imamate government monopolized all weapons in its own stores away from the hands of Yemenis, and anxiety about the infantry units present in Sana'a that carried out the Imamate's orders without hesitation or delay²⁹.

The Free Officers Organization of 1961 and Its Role in the Outbreak of the Yemeni Revolution

There are a set of factors that push any military institution to intervene in political life. The army's primary function is to protect the state's borders and preserve its national security. Some factors may occur that push this institution to directly intervene in the political system, including³⁰:

1. The army is considered the strongest national institution, the most organized, and includes different segments of society.
2. The army is one of the most important tools used by the ruling regime to suppress its opponents, and this conflicts with its basic function, which is to protect the people and protect the state's borders from external dangers. The Imamate

system used the whip of the army to suppress the people, and this could backfire on them as the army's focus becomes on the state's internal affairs, thus the army becomes deeply involved in politics, which may drive them to work to reach it.

3. The Imamate system received military missions from foreign countries (Russia, Egypt, Iraq) to raise the efficiency level of the Yemeni army. Through these missions, Yemeni army officers were able to learn about what other armies and countries had achieved, and that the reason for Yemen's backwardness was the corruption entrenched in the cultural, political, economic, and military aspects.
4. The backwardness of the ruling system in Yemen, the existence of popular discontent, and the Imams' rejection of any opposition or social reform.
5. The weakness of political forces and their inability to eliminate the monarchical Imamate system or effect any change in it.

There were two opinions on determining the zero hour for the outbreak of the revolution. The first called for postponing the revolution until the arrival of Prince Hasan³¹ and the rest of the Hamid al-Din family members who were living abroad at the time, then eliminating all members of the Hamid al-Din family. The second opinion preferred to hasten the outbreak of the revolution as soon as possible, for fear that Al-Badr would take his precautions and begin liquidating the elements of the revolution³². The second opinion was adopted; due to the emergence of an American plot aimed at getting rid of Imam Al-Badr and installing a prince from the Hamid al-Din family who would serve American interests, and the occurrence of revolutions by all

27 Al-Thawr, The Yemeni Revolution, pp. 132-133; Al-Salumi, Yemen, pp. 27-28.

28 The Free Officers Organization: It is a secret organization founded in Sana'a in September 1961 AD. It began with fifteen officers with the rank of lieutenant, and was able to attract a large number of officers who graduated from local military institutes. The political direction of this organization was hostile to the Imamate, and was influenced by the atmosphere of the Arab nationalist liberal tide that arose in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution in the year 1952 AD. It was initially known as the Free Officers Organization, and this organization was established because of the policies that were implemented by the Imamate regime. In Yemen, all of its members were military personnel and it was not affiliated with any party or other groups. It sparked the revolution of September 26, 1962, led by Abdullah Al-Sallal, and overthrew the royal Imamate system and transformed the ruling system into a republican system. For more information, see: Al-Rahoumi, Ahmed Muhammad and others, Secrets and Documents of the Yemeni Revolution, Afif Cultural Library, Sana'a, 4th edition, 2002 AD, pp. 53-55. It will later be referred to as: Al-Rahoumi, The Yemeni Revolution; Al-Ashwal, Saleh Ali, Facts of the Yemeni September Revolution, Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, Sana'a, 3rd edition, 1991 AD, 57-85. It will later be referred to as: Al-Ashwal, Facts of the Revolution; Afif, The Yemeni Encyclopedia, pp. 1911-1913.

29 Al-Ashwal, Facts of the Revolution, pp. 15-17.

30 Al-Saiyad, Ahmed Saleh, Authority and Opposition in Contemporary Yemen, Dar Al-Sadaqa, Beirut, 1st edition, 1992, pp. 262-264. It will later be referred to as: Al-Saiyad, Authority and Opposition.

31 Prince Hasan (1908-2003 AD): He is Saif al-Islam al-Hasan bin Imam Yahya bin Imam Muhammad Hamid al-Din. He was born on May 16, 1908 AD. He was sent by his father, Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din, as deputy to Ibb in the year 1930 AD. Then he deputized Imam Ahmed in Sana'a after the failure of the 1948 coup, and then he was appointed as Yemen's delegate to the United Nations. https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86_%D8%A8%D9%86_%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%89_%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86

32 Al-Thawr, The Yemeni Revolution, p. 133.

segments of society in various Yemeni regions, and the burning of his pictures in the streets. Also, some public disturbances began by workers and peasants. Information also reached Imam Al-Badr about a group of officers seeking to get rid of him³³.

Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal³⁴ was considered one of the senior army officers and one of the most important statesmen. Imam Al-Badr trusted him and appointed him Chief of Staff³⁵. Thus, he could move and make the necessary preparations and procedures without raising suspicion. On the day of September 29, armored units consisting of six T-34 tanks, four armored vehicles, and two artillery pieces moved from Hodeidah to Sana'a in preparation for the coup against Imam Al-Badr, at about eleven o'clock at night. He also obtained authorization to move the armored vehicles from Hodeidah city to the Yemeni capital Sana'a³⁶.

Imam Al-Badr was presiding over a meeting at his palace on the evening of that day. Among those present was Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal, who asked the Imam's permission to leave the meeting due to his inability to continue the discussions, before starting the first steps of the coup³⁷. As soon as he left the meeting, gunfire was opened on the Imam's palace at Dar al-Basha'ir³⁸ where he was gathered³⁹, specifically the fourth floor, which was the seat of the Imam's rule⁴⁰.

At half past eleven, a military force moved to take control of Sana'a radio station⁴¹ and the airport. Al-

Sallal broadcast the news of Imam Al-Badr's death during the palace bombing operation⁴². In fact, Imam Al-Badr had fled with his personal guard from Sana'a city⁴³, disguised in a military uniform provided to him by a woman who hosted him in her home the day after the coup operation⁴⁴. By nightfall, he left with five men. By the morning of the day after the coup, the number of those supporting him reached 1,500, and the Imam continued the process of searching for supporters⁴⁵. Al-Sallal announced through Sana'a radio the collapse of the Zaydi monarchical system and the establishment of the republican system, calling on all army members to support and endorse the revolution⁴⁶, and imposing a curfew throughout Yemen⁴⁷.

By dawn, Sana'a city was under the control of the revolutionaries⁴⁸. On the morning of September 27, only women remained in Dar al-Basha'ir. Soldiers and citizens searched them, looted them, and treated them badly. They were detained along with a group of the Imam's relatives inside a large house in Sana'a city⁴⁹. The September 26 revolution is considered the first revolution to succeed in achieving its goals, and it was a hope for all segments of Yemeni society, which it promised a new stage of prosperity and development. The September 26 revolution differed from previous revolutions as it sought a radical change in the ruling system, moving Yemen from the

33 Al-Saiyad, *Authority and Opposition*, p. 266.

34 Abdullah Al-Sallal (1917-1994 AD): He is Abdullah bin Yahya Al-Sallal. He was born in Sana'a in the year 1917 AD. He came from a poor family. Imam Yahya's government assigned the position of Sheikh of the Night to his father to supervise the night guard and protect the city with its homes and shops. Al-Sallal loved the land, horse riding, and equestrianism. He lost his father at the age of seven, and then joined the orphan school. Al-Sallal was at first a military mission was sent to Iraq in the year 1936 AD, and he graduated from it with the rank of lieutenant. In Iraq, Al-Sallal was impressed by the progress and prosperity he saw there, and this is what planted hatred in him for the Hamid al-Din family in Yemen, who sowed isolation and backwardness in it. After his return, he was imprisoned more than once as a result of his orientation to revolutionary work and his stand against the Imam. He later led the revolution in 1962 AD that overthrew the monarchy, and became the first president of the Yemen Arab Republic in 1936. 1962-1967 AD. For more, see Afif, *The Yemeni Encyclopedia*, pp. 1607-1610.

35 Ingrams, *Yemen Imams*, p. 111.

36 Opalance, *Revolution and War*, p. 119.

37 Soviets, *Contemporary History of Yemen*, p. 119.

38 Dar al-Basha'ir: A palace located in the city of Sana'a, and it is considered the seat of rule of the Al-Badr regime. In 1962 AD, a military coup took place and the Imam was attacked there. The forces damaged the third and fourth floors and they thought they had killed Imam Al-Badr. Prepared by a National Book Committee, *Yemen Revolution and Peace*, National Printing and Publishing House - Yemen, DT, p. 57. It will later be referred to as: National House, *Revolution and Peace*.

39 Al-Hilwa, Muhammad Ibrahim, *Political Modernization in North Yemen*, *Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies*, p. 35, Kuwait University, p. 157. It will later be referred to as: Al-Hilwa, *Political Modernization*.

40 Opalance, *Revolution and War*, p. 121.

41 Al-Rahoumi, *The Yemeni Revolution*, p. 243. Soviets, *Contemporary History of Yemen*, p. 122.

42 Al-Difaa, *Jerusalem*, No. 8119, September 28, 1962, p. 1.

43 Al-Thawr, *The Yemen Revolution*, p. 137.

44 Al-Manar, *Jerusalem*, No. 711, October 4, 1962, p. 1.

45 Ingrams, *Yemen Imams*, p. 118.

46 Opalance, *Revolution and War*, pp. 121-122.

47 Al-Manar, *Jerusalem*, No. 706, September 28, 1962, p. 1.

48 Al-Difaa, *Jerusalem*, No. 8119, September 28, 1962, p. 1.

49 Opalance, *Revolution and War*, pp. 122-123.

far left to the far right⁵⁰.

*The First Announcement of the Revolution, September 27, 1962*⁵¹

In the name of God, and in the name of the free, independent Yemeni people, and in the name of the Yemen Arab Republic, the leadership of the revolution announces its goals and its general policy in the domestic, Arab national, and international spheres. The goals of the revolution are:

1. Eliminating absolute individual rule and eliminating foreign influence.
2. Ending monarchical rule and establishing a republican, democratic, Islamic rule based on social justice for a state representing the people, achieving their general political demands for the Yemen Arab Republic.

We conclude from the revolution's announcement the desire to eliminate despotic rule, true independence for Yemen away from foreign influence, transforming the ruling system from a monarchical to a republican democratic system, reviving the true Islamic Sharia, moving away from the sanctification of the ruler, forming a popular organization to monitor state agencies and participate in decision-making, establishing a strong regular army to protect Yemenis from internal and external dangers and colonial influence, working to achieve national unity, strengthening (Yemeni-Arab) relations, abolishing sectarian and racial discrimination and considering all citizens equal before the law in the rights and duties entrusted to them, abolishing slavery and servitude, the hostage system, committing to neutrality and respecting United Nations charters, and its desire to establish friendly relations with any country in the world that has respected Yemen's independence and sovereignty, agreeing to international aid without compromising the country's independence, attempting to attract international and Arab investments, and elevating the cultural, economic, social, and political level of the Yemeni people who suffered during the era of the Imamate system.

The constitution of the revolution, consisting of 60

articles, was announced. It included the form of government in Yemen, affirming that Yemen is part of the Arab nation, and that Islam is the state religion. It also included the basic components of Yemeni society, clarified rights and duties, referred to the powers enjoyed by the President of the Republic, affirmed the existence of the Supreme Council of State Authorities represented by the Presidential Council, clarified their powers and conditions for joining, outlined the components of the Executive Council, stated that it is responsible before the Presidential Council and subordinate to the laws issued by the Presidential Council, clarified its jurisdictions and tasks, affirmed the independence of the judiciary, that judges are not subject to dismissal, that their rulings are issued in the name of the people, and it was noted that the constitution is provisional until obtaining the approval of the Yemeni people⁵².

It is worth mentioning that many uprisings occurred against the rule of the Imams before 1962, but they ended in failure, the elimination of their leaders, and the suppression of all opponents. However, all these uprisings started and ended without any military intervention by other states, Arab or foreign, or their open endorsement or even recognition. But what happened in 1962 was completely different from the events and revolutions that preceded it. For example, Egypt, under the leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, officially recognized the new regime and supported it militarily⁵³.

After the change that occurred in Yemen's ruling system from monarchical to republican during the 1962 revolution, Saudi Arabia's view of Yemen changed, as Saudi Arabia was not satisfied with that under any circumstances. Throughout the previous years, Saudi Arabia had supported the Zaydi monarchical system, and this was clear from its stance on the events of 1948 and 1955⁵⁴ to preserve Zaydi rule. It opposed any attempt to change the existing ruling system in Yemen on a republican basis⁵⁵.

Therefore, we find that Saudi Arabia took a clear

50 Yemeni Studies and Research Center, National Documentary Symposium on the Yemeni Revolution, October 14, Yemeni Studies and Research Center, Sana'a, 1st edition, 1993, p. 194. It will later be referred to as: Center, National Symposium.

51 For more information on the statement of the revolution in the internal sphere and the goals and politics of the revolution in the Arab national sphere and in the international sphere, see: Al-Rahoumi, Secrets and Documents, pp. 227-255; Al-Baydani, The Crisis of the Arab Nation, pp. 317-318.

52 Al-Rahoumi, Secrets and Documents, pp. 228-235.

53 Al-Hadidi, Salahuddin, Witness to the Yemen War, Madbouly Library, Cairo, 1st edition, 1984 AD, pp. 39-40. He will later be referred to as: Al-Hadidi, witness.

54 Soviets, Contemporary History of Yemen, pp. 82-101.

55 Al-Oqab, Abdul Wahab Adam, The Development of Yemeni-Saudi Relations, Raslan Foundation House, Damascus, 1st edition, 2011, p. 128. It will later be referred to as: Al-Oqab, the development of Yemeni-Saudi relations.

hostile stance towards the revolution⁵⁶. The Saudi position was not a result of Egyptian intervention, but it is clear that that intervention increased the severity of the Saudi stance towards the revolution; especially after the announcement by President Gamal Abdel Nasser and President Abdullah al-Sallal about exporting the revolution outside Yemen. Thus, Saudi Arabia became convinced that the real goal behind Egyptian intervention was to overthrow the Saudi regime, control its oil wells, and increase Egyptian influence in the Arabian Peninsula⁵⁷.

On September 27, 1962, Jeddah radio broadcast a royal announcement issued by the Saudi Royal Court, in which it determined its position on what was happening in Yemen, and affirmed its stand alongside the Hamid al-Din family to oppose the revolution and restore the Zaydi monarchical throne⁵⁸. On this basis, the Saudi government took a series of military, political, and economic measures to preserve its strategic security. Saudi rulers viewed Yemen with special attention due to its geographical proximity to them, and the extent of this location's impact on Saudi interests and stability⁵⁹. Therefore, the Saudi government took military measures to

defend itself, issuing a decision for general mobilization, canceling all leaves, sending three squadrons of aircraft to an air base near the Yemeni border, and moving many anti-aircraft guns and positioning them in the Najran region⁶⁰. The Egyptian and Yemeni governments at the time interpreted these defensive measures as an aggressive attack on the new regime and support for the royalist forces⁶¹.

Among the measures taken by the Saudi government was also the closure of the Saudi Commission located in Ta'izz, on October 1, 1962. King Saud⁶² also ordered the sending of large quantities of money, ammunition, weapons, and a number of officers to train those loyal to the Zaydi monarchical regime⁶³. Camps were built for them in both Jizan⁶⁴ and Najran, in addition to other locations on the Saudi-Yemeni border⁶⁵, following Prince Hassan's request for Saudi support to restore the throne and expel Egyptian forces⁶⁶.

The scale of Saudi support increased after confirming that Imam Al-Badr (1926-1996) was

56 Al-Hadidi, witness, 35.

57 Al-Ali, Basil Ali, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations 1932-1962*, Master's Thesis, Published, University of Jordan, 1997, pp. 93-94. He will later be referred to as: Al-Ali, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations*.

58 Al-Oqab, Abdul-Wahhab Adam, *The Development of Yemeni Relations 1948-1970 AD*, Aden University Press, Yemen, 1st edition, ed., p. 193. Later referred to as: Al-Oqab, *Relations 1948-1970*; Al-Saiyad, Ahmed Saleh, *Authority and Opposition in Contemporary Yemen*, Dar Al-Sadaqa, Beirut, 1st edition, 1992, p. 273. It will later be referred to as: Al-Saiyad, *Authority and Opposition*.

59 Al-Qabaa, Abdullah Saud, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations*, Al-Farazdaq Press, Riyadh, 1st edition, 1992, pp. 202-204. It will later be referred to as: Al-Qabaa, *Yemeni Saudi Relations*; Faraj, Ahmed, *Men in the Trenches Defending the Revolution*, Yemeni Historical Library, Yemen, 1st edition, 1995, p. 127. It will later be referred to as: Faraj, *Men in the Trench*.

60 Najran: The Najran region occupies the southern part of the Interior Plateau region in the southwest of the Kingdom. It is located directly north of the border line between the Kingdom and Yemen. It extends from the east of the Qahtan Heights to northern Yemen until it reaches the Al-Wajid Plateau located on the edge of the Empty Quarter in the east. Its area is more than 20,000 km². Its land consists of igneous base rocks and contains many types of rocks such as green stone. Al-Shareef, Abdul Rahman Sadiq, *The Geography of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Southwest Region of the Kingdom*, Al-Marikh Publishing House - Riyadh, 1st edition, 1984 AD, p. 391. It will later be referred to as: Al-Shareef, *Geography of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*.

61 Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, p. 92.

62 King Saud (1902-1969 AD): Saud bin Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman Al-Faisal Al Saud, one of the kings of the Saudi state. He was born in Kuwait and grew up in Riyadh. He read from some of its sheikhs. He led many of his father's battles. He assumed the Saudi throne in 1953 AD after the death of his father. His entourage helped him to flounder in foreign and internal policy. Management dysfunction and financial confusion began to work until he was forced In 1958 to cede all his powers in internal, external, and financial affairs to his brother and Crown Prince Faisal. He was impatient with his brother's exclusive work, so he intervened, and the course of government was disturbed. The notables of the Al Saud family and the scholars of Riyadh met and issued a statement in 1964 AD deposing Saud and pledging allegiance to Faisal. After that, Saud traveled with his family to the Greek capital, Athens, and died in 1969 AD. He was buried in the cemeteries of the ruling family in Riyadh. Al-Zirakli, Khair al-Din, Al-A'lam, a dictionary of biographies of the most famous Arab men and women, Arabs, and Orientalists, vol. 3, Dar Al-Ilm, Beirut, 7th edition, 1986, p. 90. It will later be referred to as: Al-Zirakli, *Al-A'lam*, vol. 3.

63 Faraj, *Men in the Trench*, p. 127; Abu Zikra, Wajih, *Flowers Are Buried in Yemen*, 2nd edition, 1977, p. 30. It will later be referred to as: Abu Zikra, *Flowers Are Buried*.

64 Jizan: It was called Jazan, and it is a region located in the southwest of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The borders of this region extend from the shore of the Red Sea in the west to the Asir Mountains in the east, and from the Kingdom's border line in the south with Yemen until Wadi Atoud and Wadi Hali in the north. It also includes all the basins of the earth's territory, the southwestern valleys of the Kingdom. This region is characterized by complex terrain, and it is an agricultural region. Al-Shareef, *Geography of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, pp. 167-169.

65 Opalance, Edgar, *Yemen Revolution and War until 1970 AD*, translated by Abdul Khaleq Muhammad, Madbouly Library, Cairo, 1st edition, 1985 AD, p. 151. Later referred to as: Opalance, *Revolution and War*; Abu Zikra, *Flowers Are Buried*, p. 30.

66 Al-Difaa, Jerusalem, No. 8122, October 2, 1962, p. 4

alive⁶⁷, as he sent a telegram to King Saud informing him that he had managed to survive and leave Sana'a and that he would fight the revolutionaries for the throne⁶⁸. The Saudi government was very keen to be close to the battlefield by facilitating communication operations with northern Yemeni tribes. It also placed a radio station at the disposal of the Imam's soldiers to incite the tribes against the Abdullah al-Sallal regime, affirming Saudi support for them and that victory is coming⁶⁹. Saudi Arabia bet on the ability of the Yemeni tribes to restore the Zaydi throne, and its bet was based on what the tribes did in 1948 and 1955 when they managed to restore the throne to Imam Ahmed⁷⁰.

It is mentioned that some pilots in the Royal Saudi Air Force - who did not exceed six in number - fled with their aircraft loaded with ammunition and weapons to Egypt instead of assisting Muhammad al-Badr's forces in Yemen. This prompted King Saud to issue orders to ground the air force on Saudi territory for several weeks without any of them moving; to ensure the loyalty of all air force pilots⁷¹.

Some sources mention that a number of members of the Saudi Consultative Assembly signed a memorandum demanding King Saud's recognition of the new Yemeni republic⁷². Also, a number of members of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia who rejected all decisions taken by King Saud to support the royalists⁷³ in Yemen appeared. This led to disturbances within the Saudi household, which pushed King Saud to relinquish actual power to his brother Prince Faisal (1906 - 1975), who became Prime Minister and supervisor of the Saudi government.

Prince Faisal was not inclined towards the Hamid al-Din family, but due to the continuation of support provided by King Saud, he restructured the Saudi ministries, dismissing six ministers who had suggested the necessity of recognizing the new

regime in Yemen⁷⁴. Prince Faisal also carried out many reforms within the state, promising to establish a Basic Law (constitution) for the Kingdom, announcing the abolition of slavery in the state, establishing a judicial council, and presenting many economic and military reforms⁷⁵.

One of the most prominent actions from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the Saudi government's acceptance of Imam Al-Badr as a refugee on its soil along with a group of his entourage, in addition to Prince Hassan. Prince Hassan declared himself the legitimate Imam of Yemen after the revolutionaries spread the rumor that Imam Al-Badr had died. When Prince Hassan learned that Al-Badr was alive, he announced his resignation from the Imamate and his support for his nephew Imam Al-Badr as the legitimate Imam of the Yemeni Mutawakkilite Kingdom⁷⁶. Saudi Arabia officially announced its intention to stand by Imam Al-Badr to reclaim his throne, and on October 8 of the same year, the Saudi government confirmed that it was not engaging with any forces on the Yemeni border⁷⁷.

The Saudi government had agreed to Hassan's declaration as Imam of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom to preserve order and stability in it in the face of the revolutionaries⁷⁸ before finding Imam Al-Badr's body. It was customary in Yemen to display the bodies of the deposed or others before the eyes of the people, but Imam Al-Badr's body left no trace, and there was no evidence of the Imam's death except one statement issued by the revolutionary government, affirming that the Imam was buried under the rubble of his palace after the bombing. This news was incorrect under any circumstances because the palace did not become rubble; when the palace was bombed, only the upper floors were damaged and part of those floors was destroyed, but the main structure remained standing⁷⁹.

67 Opalance, *Revolution and War*, p. 151. Al-Oqab, *Relations 1948-1970 AD*, pp. 94-95.

68 Al-Difaa, *Jerusalem*, No. 8135, October 17, 1962, p. 1.

69 Al-Hadidi, *witness*, p. 43.

70 Al-Oqab, *Relations 1948-1970 AD*, p. 94.

71 Opalance, *Revolution and War*, p. 152.

72 Joyce, Gregory, *Yemeni-Saudi Relations: Past and Present*, translated by Samia Al-Shami and Talaat Ghoneim, Madbouli Library - Cairo, n.d., 1993, p. 99. It will be referred to hereafter as: Joyce, *Past and Present*.

73 The Royalists: They are those loyal to the Hamid al-Din family, who advocate that Yemen should be under the authority of a king.

74 Opalance, *Revolution and War*, p. 152; Al-Haddad, Muhammad bin Yahya, *The General History of Yemen: The Political, Social and Cultural History from the Beginning of Ancient Yemeni History to the Present Day*, Contemporary Yemen, Volume Three, Irshad Library, Sana'a, 1st Edition, 2008, p. 121. It will later be referred to as: Al-Haddad, *The General History of Yemen*.

75 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 100.

76 Al-Hadidi, *Witness*, p. 40; Opalance, *Revolution and War*, p. 146; Al-Difaa, *Al-Quds*, No. 8128, October 9, 1962, p. 4; Abu Zikra, *Flowers Are Buried*, p. 29.

77 Al-Difaa, *Jerusalem*, Issue 8127, October 8, 1962, p. 4.

78 Al-Manar, *Jerusalem*, No. 708, October 1, 1962, p. 1.

79 Al-Difaa, *Jerusalem*, Issue 8127, October 8, 1962, p. 1.

The Saudi-Jordanian Alliance to Confront the Yemeni Revolution of 1962

The Jordanian government announced its hostile stance towards the Yemeni revolution, as the government confirmed that Egyptian intervention in the Yemeni revolution would be negative and would affect the Arab arena. The Jordanian leadership doubted Gamal Abdel Nasser's intentions, finding in Egyptian intervention in Yemen a form of extending influence and expansion⁸⁰. Jordan clarified that its position was not influenced by political disagreements with any state⁸¹.

Even in early October 1962, the Jordanian government refrained from recognizing the Yemeni Republic. The Yemeni response was to expel the Jordanian military mission that was present in Sana'a. When Prince Hassan announced the formation of a government-in-exile in Jeddah on October 5, 1962, which was headed first by Hassan and then by Imam Al-Badr himself, the Jordanian government stood by him, supported him in this step, and recognized his government⁸².

King Hussein was an opponent of President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the media attacks carried out by Egypt on Jordan. King Hussein sent an envoy on his behalf to Prince Hassan in Jeddah to express the King's friendship and sympathy. He also supported him media-wise. Jordan sent some financial aid to the Imam's army, and that aid was not large; because Jordan did not have surplus beyond its needs. He lent a number of Jordanian army officers, as King Hussein announced that he had sent about sixty Jordanian officers to support the Imam's army, in order to provide advice and support for training the Imam's forces in camps near the Saudi-Yemeni border⁸³.

It is mentioned that the Jordanian government wanted to develop the military assistance provided to the Imam's army by sending a military brigade to the Saudi-Yemeni border to carry out military operations in cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

However, King Saud refused that due to his fear of the forces' defeat and the revolution spreading into Saudi territory. Perhaps Saudi Arabia was not enthusiastic about military intervention like Jordan, fearing a violent reaction from Egyptian forces⁸⁴.

Al-Sallal - after the Saudi government's refusal to recognize him and his government - announced that he did not recognize the borders between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, describing them as artificial borders, and requested Saudi opposition figures to form a government-in-exile. However, this government was not realized on the ground. Yemen announced that it would bomb the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan if either of them bombed it from the air. The Yemeni Republic did not possess any air force, not even a single plane, but it relied completely on the Egyptian air force⁸⁵. On November 4, 1962, Saudi Arabia announced the establishment of a military alliance between it and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan⁸⁶, in order to restore Zaydi Imamate rule in Yemen.

Under this alliance, a joint defense council was established between the two states. It was agreed to provide advice and consultations from the Jordanian side to the Saudi side, increase the number of Jordanian armed forces, and unify the air force between the two states⁸⁷. The Saudi government hesitated to implement the agreement as it should, limiting it to mutual visits between military leaderships of the two states⁸⁸. The reason for Saudi Arabia's non-compliance in implementing the agreement was that Prince Faisal and some Saudi officials were not satisfied with the agreement⁸⁹.

Egypt began bombing Saudi border villages near Najran⁹⁰, which led to the injury of a number of its residents, the flight of its inhabitants, and material losses to them⁹¹. Saudi Arabia considered the Egyptian bombing of its cities and villages a step

80 Muhafazah, Ali, Collection of Speeches of His Majesty King Hussein bin Talal the Great 1952-1977 AD, Vol. 2, Ministry of Information, Amman, n.d., 1978 AD, p. 95. It will be later referred to as: Muhafazah, Speeches of King Hussein.

81 Al-Tall, Wasfi, Writings on Arab Issues, Dar Al-Liwa for Press and Publishing, Amman, n.d., 1980, p. 195. It will be later referred to as, Al-Tall, Writings.

82 Opalance, Revolution and War, pp. 128-135; Al-Hilwa, Muhammad Ibrahim, Political Modernization in North Yemen, Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, No. 35, Kuwait University, n.d., p. 158. It will be later referred to as: Al-Hilwa, Political Modernization.

83 Opalance, Revolution and War, pp. 150-151.

84 Al-Ajlouni, Salah Abdullah, The Jordanian Position on the Yemeni Revolution 1962-1967 AD, University Thesis, Unpublished, Yarmouk University, 1998 AD, p. 72. It will be later referred to as: Al-Ajlouni, The Yemeni Revolution.

85 Opalance, Revolution and War, p. 152.

86 Al-Hilwa, Political Modernization, p. 159; Opalance, Revolution and War, p. 152; Al-Hadidi, Witness, p. 35.

87 Al-Ajlouni, The Yemeni Revolution, pp. 79-80.

88 Opalance, Revolution and War, p. 152.

89 Al-Ajlouni, The Yemeni Revolution, pp. 79-80.

90 Opalance, Revolution and War, p. 152; Al-Qaba', Saudi-Yemeni Relations, p. 204.

91 Al-Jihad, Jerusalem, No. 2908, January 5, 1963, p. 3.

threatening its national security⁹². Prince Faisal purchased an expensive ground-to-air missile defense network in addition to buying a large number of British aircraft to increase the strength and effectiveness of the Saudi air force⁹³.

On December 21, 1962, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced the severance of its diplomatic relations with Egypt; following the Egyptian air force's bombing of Saudi villages adjacent to the Yemeni border, in addition to Egypt's support for the Yemeni revolution⁹⁴.

After the Egyptian raids on Saudi cities, cooperation between the Saudi and Jordanian governments increased. Jordan announced that it stands alongside Saudi Arabia and severed its relations with Egypt. The Egyptian attack on Saudi Arabia was considered an attack on Jordan, and the aggression was described as an important sign of the bad Arab condition due to Egyptian policy⁹⁵.

Jordan and Saudi Arabia agreed after these attacks to take joint defensive measures. A squadron of the Jordanian air force was placed at Saudi Arabia's disposal along with teams of experts. These aircraft were entrusted with the task of providing support to Saudi aircraft in any defensive operations⁹⁶. It is mentioned that sending these aircraft was at the request of King Saud due to the grounding of the Saudi air force after the defection operations to Egypt as mentioned earlier⁹⁷.

The Role of Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz in the Yemeni Revolution of 1962

The course of events related to the Yemeni revolution represented a clear danger to the Saudi regime and also in the Arabian Peninsula, as mentioned earlier. We cannot address the position of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the Yemeni

revolution of 1962 without addressing what Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz did, as he sensed the danger to his country from the beginning of the revolution and made political moves at the local and global levels to defend the Saudi position against the republicans. Prince Faisal also played a prominent role in confronting the Yemeni revolution when he was a prince, and also after he assumed the throne of Saudi Arabia.

First: His Lineage, Birth, and Upbringing

He is Faisal bin Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faisal bin Turki bin Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Saud bin Muhammad bin Muqrin bin Markhan bin Ibrahim bin Musa bin Rabia bin Mani' bin al-Musayyab bin al-Muqallad bin Badran bin Malik bin Salim bin Malik bin Ghassan bin Rabia bin Munqidh bin al-Harith bin Sa'd bin Hamam bin Murra bin Dhal bin Shayban bin Tha'laba bin Ukaba bin Sa'b bin Ali bin Bakr bin Wa'il bin Qasit bin Hanb bin Du'mi bin Jadila bin Asad bin Rabia bin Nizar bin Ma'd bin Adnan⁹⁸. He is the third son of his father⁹⁹, King Abdulaziz, and he traces back to the Adnanite Arabs who lived in the north and center of the Arabian Peninsula from the western side. He is nicknamed after his eldest son Abdullah. His father named him Faisal, named after Faisal bin Turki, the founder of the second Saudi state¹⁰⁰.

Historical accounts differ regarding the birth date of Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. Some say he was born in Riyadh on 14 Safar 1324 AH / April 1906¹⁰¹, and others say he was born in the month of Shawwal, and his mother is named Turfa¹⁰².

Faisal was intelligent and quick-witted. He grew up in Riyadh and was raised in the house of his grandfather Abdullah bin Abdul Latif, his mother's

92 Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, p. 86.

93 Opalance, *Revolution and War*, pp. 152-153; Abu Zikra, *Flowers Are Buried*, p. 39.

94 Al-Thawr, Abdullah bin Ahmed, *Yemeni Documents: The Yemeni Revolution 1948-1968*, Dar Ihya al-Kutub al-Arabiyya, Cairo, 2nd ed., 1986, p. 148. It will be referred to hereafter as: Al-Thawr, *The Yemeni Revolution*; Al-Qaba', *Saudi-Yemeni Relations*, p. 204; Al-Hilwa, *Political Modernization*, p. 159.

95 Al-Ajlouni, *The Yemeni Revolution*, p. 81.

96 Al-Mousa, Suleiman, *History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century 1958-1995*, Vol. 2, Al-Muhtasib Library, Amman, 1st ed., 1996, p. 53. It will be referred to hereafter as: Al-Mousa, *History of Jordan*.

97 Al-Ajlouni, *The Yemeni Revolution*, p. 82.

98 Al-Hussain, Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Aziz, *Faisal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud and his efforts in Arab and Islamic issues*, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh, 1st ed., 2001 AD, p. 11. It will be later referred to as: Al-Hussain, *Faisal*.

99 Al-Zarkali, *Al-A'lam*, p. 166.

100 Harb, Muhammad, *King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz*, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Lubnani, Beirut, 1st edition, 1991 AD, p. 8. It will be later referred to as: Harb, *King Faisal*.

101 Harb, *King Faisal*, p. 8; Al-Zarkali, *Al-A'lam*, Vol. 5, p. 166; Al-Badi, Awad, *King Faisal bin Abdul Aziz - may God have mercy on him 1324 - 1395 AH*, Al-Diplomasi Magazine, No. 2, Riyadh, 1982 AD, p. 83. It will be later referred to as: Al-Badi, *King Faisal*.

102 Turfa: She is the daughter of Sheikh Abdullah bin Abdul Latif Al Sheikh, the granddaughter of Imam Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, the preacher and reformer. She is the third wife of King Abdul Aziz. She gave birth to Noura and then gave birth to Faisal. She died five months after his birth. Al-Zarkali, Khair Al-Din, *The Arabian Peninsula in the Era of King Abdul Aziz*, Vol. 3, Dar Al-Ilm Lil-Malayin, Beirut, 2nd ed., p. 954.

father¹⁰³, who was one of the most learned scholars in Riyadh. He learned the etiquette of the Arabic language¹⁰⁴, received the principles of religious sciences, and completed the memorization of the Noble Quran before reaching the age of ten. His father, King Abdulaziz, cared for him and had the greatest credit in forming his personality, as he cared for his upbringing on political and military foundations. He undertook major responsibilities at a young age; he represented the Saudi Kingdom in Britain at the age of thirteen, and participated in the military operations to unify the Arabian Peninsula¹⁰⁵. His upbringing was a blend of religious culture, which his grandfather undertook, and political, social, and military education, which his father undertook. His father taught him good conduct with people, patience, secrecy, self-control, and self-esteem¹⁰⁶, chivalry, and carrying the sword¹⁰⁷.

Second: Political Positions

Faisal held many political positions before being crowned King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They can be summarized as follows¹⁰⁸:

1. He assumed the position of Deputy to his father in the Hijaz on January 13, 1926.
2. He assumed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the establishment of Saudi diplomacy on December 19, 1930.
3. He assumed the Ministry of Interior in 1930.
4. Presidency of the Council of Agents on January 16, 1932.
5. Presidency of the Consultative Council in 1927.

As for Prince Faisal's role in supporting the Imamate system and eliminating the revolutionaries, and thus eliminating the new regime in Yemen, it was represented by a series of actions, the most

prominent of which was Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz's visit to the United States of America in 1962. Saudi Arabia issued a statement to the effect that what was happening in Yemen was a minor coup¹⁰⁹. This description of the coup was a prelude to convincing the American administration of the necessity of not supporting this coup. This was one day after Prince Hassan, the brother of Imam Ahmed, announced his desire to head to Saudi Arabia and then to Yemen to lead the Yemeni people against the new regime¹¹⁰. In September 1962, preparations were made for a visit by Prince Faisal to New York to attend a session of the United Nations General Assembly¹¹¹. Prince Faisal summoned the American ambassador and asked him to pave the way for a visit with American President John Kennedy¹¹². The ambassador arranged that meeting. Prince Faisal knew that the American administration did not hold favor for the Saudi regime, due to the meeting that took place between King Saud bin Abdulaziz and John Kennedy, which left a negative impact from the American side. The American ambassador knew the American administration's stance regarding the Saudi regime, but he hoped that would change after Prince Faisal's visit, as he knew he was one of the skilled politicians in foreign affairs. The Yemeni revolution played a role in accelerating the meeting between Prince Faisal and John Kennedy¹¹³.

Prince Faisal sought from this meeting the necessity of obtaining assistance from the United States of America to confront Egyptian intervention in Yemen. Therefore, he tried to strengthen relations with the United States. On September 26, 1962, the Yemeni events reached American television. Faisal contacted the American State Department by phone

103 Abdullah ibn Abdul Latif (1849-1921 CE): He was Abdullah ibn Abdul Latif ibn Abdul Rahman ibn Hassan ibn Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, a jurist and preacher from Najd. He was born in Hofuf in 1849 CE and died in Riyadh in 1921 CE, where he was buried. He was a religious authority for the people of Najd and participated in their politics and wars. He was known for his generosity and intelligence. (Al-Zarkali, Khair al-Din, Al-A'lam, A Dictionary of Biographies of the Most Famous Men and Women from the Arabs, Arabized Peoples, and Orientalists, Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin, n.d., vol. 4, p. 99. He will be later referred to as: Al-Zarkali, Al-A'lam, vol. 4.)

104 Al-Badi, King Faisal, Vol. 2, p. 83

105 Al-Hussain, Faisal, pp. 13-16; Al-Badi, King Faisal, No. 2, 84.

106 Harb, King Faisal, p. 8.

107 Al-Badi, Faisal, Vol. 2, p. 83.

108 Al-Hussain, Faisal, 81-122.

109 Al-Manar, Jerusalem, No. 708, October 1, 1962, p. 1.

110 Al-Manar, Jerusalem, No. 707, September 30, 1962, p. 1.

111 Harb, King Faisal, p. 47.

112 John Joseph Kennedy (John F. Kennedy), also known by his initials JFK, was of Irish descent. Born on May 29, 1917, he was the second son of Joseph Kennedy. He grew up in a wealthy Boston family and studied political science at Harvard University. During World War II, he volunteered for the Army in 1943, sustaining a back injury and retiring in 1945. He entered politics in January 1947 as a congressman and later served as a U.S. senator. He married Jacqueline Kennedy on September 12, 1953. Kennedy became President of the United States in 1960 after defeating Richard Nixon. He was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963. His assassination remains a mystery, giving rise to numerous theories and hypotheses, and has been the subject of many books and articles. For more information, see: Muhafazah, Personalities, pp. 379-384.

113 Vasiliev, Alexei, King Faisal: His Personality, Era and Faith, translated by Khairi Al-Dhamin, Dar Al-Saqi, Beirut, 1st edition, 2013, pp. 475-476. It will be later referred to as: Vasiliev, King Faisal.

and asked them to summon Issa al-Sabbagh, the translator of the American mission in Jeddah. The Prince informed him of the anxiety he felt due to the events occurring in Yemen and the change of the ruling system. He also reminded him that he was confident of the reason for President Gamal Abdel Nasser's intervention in the Yemeni revolution, and that the intervention was not only support for the republicans but the first step to control Saudi Arabia. He asked al-Sabbagh to go to Washington to seek an answer to this question: "Will the United States be with the Kingdom against potential internal subversion and against aggression from abroad? Go back to Washington and convey the content of our conversation to the officials at the State Department."¹¹⁴

The American State Department's response to Prince Faisal was that the United States of America would take all necessary measures to protect its ally - the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - from any internal or external aggression¹¹⁵. The State Department also affirmed that the United States of America expected Prince Faisal to carry out reforms within Saudi Arabia, and that this reform was the best means to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Saudi monarchical regime¹¹⁶.

We conclude from the above that Prince Faisal was keen on the United States of America standing by his side to confront the revolutionaries in Yemen. He knew that the American stance would bring about a clear change to what was happening in Yemen. He wanted to prove to Gamal Abdel Nasser that the United States would continue to defend the Kingdom under any circumstances from any external danger,

meaning the attempts of al-Sallal and Abdel Nasser to transfer the revolution from Yemen to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and that the United States would defend against any internal or external danger threatening the security and stability of the Saudi regime, as well as any attempt by Gamal Abdel Nasser to support figures from the Saudi household would end in failure.

Prince Faisal was not one who inclined towards the Zaydi Shiite system in Yemen, which was contradictory¹¹⁷ to the prevailing religious thought in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represented in Wahhabism, attributed to Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab¹¹⁸. However, Egyptian intervention in Yemen and the declaration of the republican system represented an explicit threat to the Saudi regime. Prince Faisal knew of the existence of a not insignificant number of members of the Saudi armed forces who supported Nasserist ideas¹¹⁹.

On October 4, 1962, a lunch meeting took place between Faisal and Kennedy at the White House. Prince Faisal knew of Kennedy's neutral stance. This meeting resulted in convincing the then American president to send warships to Saudi ports located on the Red Sea. The goal of sending the ships was to protect Saudi Arabia only. Prince Faisal also tried to convince the American president to delay recognition of the republican regime in Yemen¹²⁰, and affirmed that the Kingdom was ready for full cooperation with the United States to confront communist expansion in the Arab region, in return for standing by Saudi Arabia and putting pressure on Gamal Abdel Nasser to end his intervention in Yemen¹²¹.

114 Vasiliev, King Faisal, p. 477.

115 Al-Baydani, Abdul Rahman, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation and the Yemeni Revolution*, Modern Egyptian Library, Cairo, 3rd edition, 1984, p. 565. It will be referred to hereafter as: Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*.

116 Vasiliev, King Faisal, p. 477.

117 Vasiliev, King Faisal, p. 477.

118 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792 CE): He is the founder of the Wahhabi movement in Najd. Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab ibn Sulayman ibn Ali, from the Musharrafah clan, whose lineage traces back to his grandfather Musharraf al-Wahbi, who was a descendant of Wahib, a large branch of the Hanzalah tribe of Banu Tamim. His mother was the daughter of Muhammad ibn Azzaz al-Musharrafi al-Wahbi. He came from a prominent scholarly family, whose lineage was passed down through generations. Among them were his grandfather, Sheikh Sulayman ibn Ali, and his father, Sheikh Abd al-Wahhab. He was a judge, a Hanbali jurist, and a great scholar who served as judge of al-Uyaynah for fourteen years and then as judge of Huraymila for another fourteen years until his death in 1740 CE. He was born and raised in al-Uyaynah in Najd in 1703 CE. He was very intelligent, quick-witted, perceptive, eloquent, and had a remarkable memory. He memorized the Quran before he was ten years old. He allied himself with Muhammad ibn Saud, the Emir of Diriyah, in an agreement known as the Treaty of Diriyah in 1745 CE, which resulted in the establishment of the First Saudi State. The Sheikh, may God have mercy on him, died in Dhu al-Qi'dah. 1792 CE. For more information on the Wahhabi movement, see: Al-Bassam, Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman, *Scholars of Najd During Eight Centuries*, Vol. 1, Dar Al-Asimah for Publishing and Distribution, Riyadh, 2nd ed., 1998 CE, pp. 125-152; Wahbah, Hafiz, *The Arabian Peninsula in the Twentieth Century*, Egyptian Renaissance Library, Cairo, 4th ed., 1961 CE, p. 322; Ibn Ghannam, Hussein bin Abi Bakr, d. 1811 CE, *Rawdat Al-Afkar wal-Afham li-Murtad Hal Al-Imam wa-Ta'dad Fazwan Dhawi Al-Islam*, Vol. 1, Dar Al-Thuluthiyah for Publishing and Distribution, Riyadh, 1st ed., 2010 CE, p. 100; Ibn Bishr, Uthman bin Abdullah, *Unwan Al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd*, Vol. 1, Saudi Ministry of Education, Riyadh, 4th ed., 2007 CE, p. 42; Muhafazah, *Personalities*, pp. 28-33.

119 Vasiliev, King Faisal, pp. 483-485.

120 Vasiliev, King Faisal, pp. 485-487.

121 Al-Ali, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations*, pp. 94-95.

However, the John Kennedy administration did not respond to Prince Faisal's demands, as it found that nationalist regimes were more effective and influential in the region than reactionary regimes. The American president indicated that Saudi Arabia could rely on it to preserve the Kingdom's security and the integrity of its territories¹²².

On November 14, 1962, American aircraft conducted war maneuvers over major Saudi cities as a symbol of their support for them. The United States affirmed its desire to increase the number of warships and aircraft during the war maneuvers conducted by the United States in the Middle East¹²³. But it was clear that these maneuvers did not advance to the Yemeni border¹²⁴. On December 19 of the same year, the United States recognized the republican regime in Yemen¹²⁵, in return for a promise from the Egyptian leadership to withdraw its forces from it if Saudi intervention stopped¹²⁶. Jordan - Saudi Arabia's ally - viewed American recognition of the Yemeni regime as a golden opportunity to withdraw Egyptian forces from Yemen¹²⁷.

After American recognition, King Hussein announced on December 21, 1962, that Jordan would begin withdrawing its forces from the Yemeni border. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also announced that there were no forces inside Yemeni territory for it to withdraw, while President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced that Egypt had lost up to that point (136) martyrs, including (21) officers and (115) soldiers¹²⁸.

American recognition of the new regime was a shock to Prince Faisal. We can say that Saudi Arabia lost its traditional ally at a time when Saudi Arabia was not able to face the events in Yemen alone. But the matter became a reality that could not be changed, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was forced to act on what was happening in Yemen, otherwise the advancing revolutionaries from Yemen would

have another say.

We also conclude from the above that Prince Faisal was not inclined towards Zaydism in Yemen but viewed them as the protective wall for the southern territories of the Kingdom, and that they would remain under the authority of Al Saud. However, he found no alternative to them, especially after the Egyptian intervention that dreamed of reaching Saudi resources. If a new system alternative to Zaydism had to exist, it must be an ally to Saudi Arabia that respects its interests and does not allow itself to ally with any regime that plots evil against the Kingdom. Perhaps the real reason for opposing the republican regime was the fear of exporting the revolution to Saudi Arabia and attempting to change the ruling system there, the fear of Gamal Abdel Nasser extending his influence to areas close to the Kingdom, as well as distancing Saudi Arabia from President Gamal Abdel Nasser's project, and protecting its oil resources.

On November 21, 1962, Kennedy offered his mediation to resolve the ongoing conflict in Yemen. He sent to the leaders of four Arab states: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the revolutionary government in Yemen, in an attempt to comprehend what was happening in Yemen before it spiraled out of control¹²⁹. Kennedy's goal was to lay the foundation for giving guarantees of non-interference by any state in the affairs of the other state, thus ensuring stability in the Arabian Peninsula region¹³⁰.

His idea proposed at that time was for al-Sallal to announce the establishment of his state on the existing borders of Yemen at that time and respect the Sana'a Treaty of 1934¹³¹, for Gamal Abdel Nasser to withdraw from Yemen in stages, for King Hussein bin Talal to withdraw his forces from Saudi Arabia, and for Saudi Arabia to withdraw from Yemen. However, John Kennedy's proposals were not implemented, as Gamal Abdel Nasser sent many Egyptian forces to Yemen after America's recognition

122 Al-Ali, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations*, p. 95.

123 Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 565.

124 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 99.

125 Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 538.

126 Vasiliev, *King Faisal*, p. 498; Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 99.

127 Al-Manar, Jerusalem, No. 778, December 31, 1962, p. 1.

128 Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 547.

129 Al-Manar, Jerusalem, No. 758, November 28, 1962, p. 1.

130 Ingrams, *Yemen Imams*, p. 128; Al-Oqab, Abdul Wahab Adam, *The Unity of Yemen: A Documentary Study in the Contemporary History of Yemen from the Imamate of Ali to the Contemporary History of Yemen*, Dar and Raslan Foundation, Damascus, 1st ed., 2010, p. 44. It will be later referred to as: Al-Oqab, *The Unity of Yemen*.

131 The Sana'a Treaty of 1934: This treaty was signed between Imam Yahya and Britain on February 11, 1934, to end their conflict over the Awadhli region. It stipulated the Imam's withdrawal from all the Hamimah areas, the return of hostages, and the restoration of the borders to their state before the Imam's entry into southern Yemen. Both parties agreed to negotiate to reach a final agreement without resorting to violent military action. The treaty was ratified by Colonel Riley on September 4, 1934. For more information on the Sana'a Treaty of 1934, see: Salem, *The Formation of Modern Yemen*, pp. 385-395.

of the republican regime. Imam Al-Badr protested his being ignored by President John Kennedy¹³².

The American State Department also announced that it would send fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and confirmed that it would send a warship to Saudi waters, and that the American Sixth Fleet would conduct maneuvers in Saudi waters, in response to the Egyptian attacks carried out on the city of Najran¹³³. The American government also stated that it had informed the states related to the ongoing fighting in Yemen of its hope that they would withdraw from Yemeni territory as soon as possible. The American leadership also denounced the Egyptian attacks on Saudi cities and villages, especially what happened in Najran¹³⁴.

Prince Faisal's Support for the Royalist Forces and Winning Over the British Stance, 1962

On January 3, 1963, Prince Faisal announced military mobilization against Egypt¹³⁵ by alerting Saudi forces, canceling leaves for officers and soldiers, and transferring them immediately to their unit centers. Prince Faisal announced that this mobilization came for self-defense, and decided to task the Saudi Defense Council with taking all measures to preserve Saudi security and repel any attack on the population and property¹³⁶.

This announcement showed Faisal's keenness to use his own forces, as he doubted the loyalty of the Zaydi army. He also rejected the idea of forming a royal air force for the Imam based in Saudi Arabia; fearing that Egypt would strike deep into Saudi territory. While Faisal's support for the royalists was generous financially, he did not provide them with sufficient assistance in advanced military equipment, but only provided them with light weapons such as pistols, rifles, and explosives. Saudi Arabia also conscripted all Yemenis residing on its soil to join the Yemeni forces. It increased the volume of aid provided to the royalists, especially that provided in the form of funding to buy the loyalty of tribal leaders. However, the Saudi aid provided remained limited, so as not to provoke Egypt and lead to any direct Egyptian confrontation with Saudi forces,

forcing it to stop funding the royalist forces¹³⁷.

Prince Faisal equipped the Saudi forces with what they needed to face the Egyptian danger in Yemen. Prince Faisal announced on January 7, 1963, the conditions for his acceptance of a political solution. His previously mentioned proposal was for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Yemeni territory, especially Egyptian forces, and the cessation of any external aid. As for the political aspect, Prince Faisal viewed the future political situation in Yemen that the Yemeni people should determine their destiny through a general referendum encompassing all segments of Yemeni society, supervised by an international committee¹³⁸.

From late January 1963 until the end of March, many confrontations occurred between republican and royalist forces. The republican forces managed to achieve victories in many Yemeni cities, control main roads, and stop the supplies that were supporting the royalist forces¹³⁹.

As we mentioned, Faisal's support for the royalists was generous financially, but he did not provide them with advanced military equipment, only providing them with light weapons such as pistols, rifles, and explosives. However, Prince Faisal increased aid after the royalists suffered repeated defeats between January and March of 1963¹⁴⁰.

On February 22, 1963, al-Sallal announced that his government would support with weapons and men any popular revolution against King Saud and his brother Prince Faisal, and that there were indications that the ruling system in Saudi Arabia would soon face a popular revolution. This statement only poured oil on the fire, increasing Saudi hostility towards the republican regime in Yemen¹⁴¹.

On March 23, 1963, the credentials of the Yemeni Republic were accepted in the Arab League, despite Saudi opposition. The Arab League recognized the Yemeni government as representing Yemen in the Arab League. The Yemeni delegate to the Arab League in the fortieth regular session expressed his government's hope to obtain assistance from other Arab states economically and socially¹⁴².

Following these victories achieved by the

132 Ingrams, *Yemen Imams*, p. 128; Al-Oqab, *The Unity of Yemen*, p. 44.

133 Al-Jihad, Jerusalem, No. 2910, January 7, 1963, pp. 2-3.

134 Al-Jihad, Jerusalem, No. 2912, January 9, 1963, p. 3.

135 Vasiliev, *King Faisal*, p. 502.

136 Al-Jihad, Jerusalem, No. 2908, January 5, 1963, pp. 1-4; Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 595.

137 Vasiliev, *King Faisal*, p. 504.

138 Joyce, *Past and Present*, pp. 101-102.

139 Al-Haddad, *General History of Yemen*, pp. 224-225.

140 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 101.

141 Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 597.

142 Al-Oqab, *The Unity of Yemen*, pp. 46-47.

republican forces, world states began seeking to end the Yemeni problem and recognize the new reality. Both the President of the United States, John Kennedy, and the United Nations intervened to end the crisis. On April 29, 1963, Yothant, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, announced a project to end the crisis between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. It included what Prince Faisal desired, which was stopping Saudi aid to the royalists and preventing the use of its territory to fight the Yemeni Republic. In return, Egypt would gradually withdraw all its military forces from Yemen, leaving the Yemeni people to determine their destiny, and maintaining a 12-mile demilitarized zone on the Saudi-Yemeni border¹⁴³.

Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt agreed to the United Nations proposal, which was completely identical to what Prince Faisal wanted. However, Egypt refused to withdraw its forces from Yemen¹⁴⁴. Attempts continued for six months but ended in failure. The commander of the United Nations peacekeeping forces stated that there were fabricated obstacles placed to stop Yemen from reaching peace¹⁴⁵.

Prince Faisal wanted to prove to the world that the Kingdom would defend itself even without obtaining American support. Prince Faisal also knew Egypt's military strength and feared direct military confrontation with Egypt. Therefore, most of the aid provided to the Imam's army was financial aid, and even this aid was provided indirectly so that Egypt would not strike Saudi Arabia. However, he believed in a political solution, and the solution began with the withdrawal of Egyptian military forces, and the Yemeni people choosing the future of Yemen themselves.

After Prince Faisal lost hope that the United States would stand against President Gamal Abdel Nasser, he turned his attention to Britain, seeking an ally to

support him militarily and politically. The British government had not officially announced its recognition of the new republican regime in Yemen¹⁴⁶. Therefore, Prince Faisal turned to Britain in January 1963 to restore diplomatic relations between them after they had been severed due to the Suez War in 1956¹⁴⁷, where Saudi Arabia stood by Egypt and denounced the attack by French, British, and Zionist entity forces. The British government shared Prince Faisal's same feeling towards the Egyptian government and its intervention in Yemen. Therefore, the British government announced its stand and support for the Saudi government to confront the revolution in Yemen and stand by the Imam's army. In June 1963, a British military mission arrived in the Saudi Kingdom to assist it in training and improving the capabilities of the Saudi National Guard¹⁴⁸ to face the occupying Egyptian air attacks. Britain also provided Saudi Arabia with a number of aircraft, pilots, and anti-aircraft guns¹⁴⁹.

Prince Faisal stated that the Saudi government held talks with the United States on June 27, 1963, to provide American air protection for the southern part of Saudi Arabia. After the statement, American air and naval forces began heading to the southern section of the Kingdom¹⁵⁰. In September 1963, Prince Faisal confirmed to the Arab League commissioner that he would prevent any Saudi forces from crossing the Yemeni border¹⁵¹. Prince Faisal said in one of his speeches in the city of Taif on September 5, 1963: "The rulers of Egypt have declared that they have sent their military campaigns to fight in Yemen and to destroy our country and occupy it. Therefore, we were driven to a situation where we had no choice but to defend ourselves. Every state and every country in the world is empowered to defend itself"¹⁵².

King Faisal also delivered another speech in Mecca, explaining the nature of Saudi support

143 Al-Haddad, *General History of Yemen*, p. 225; Al-Oqab, *The Unity of Yemen*, pp. 44-45; Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 103; Al-Janahi, Saeed Ahmed, *The Yemeni National Movement from Revolution to Unity*, Al-Amal Center for Studies and Publishing, Sana'a, 1st ed., 1992, pp. 246-247. This will be later referred to as: Al-Janahi, *The National Movement*.

144 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 104.

145 Al-Haddad, *General History of Yemen*, p. 225; Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 104.

146 Al-Manar, Jerusalem, Issue 714, October 8, 1962, p. 1.

147 The Suez War: This was one of the key events in the Arab-Israeli conflict, also known as the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt. It occurred on October 29, 1956, following Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, which led to a military attack by Britain, France, and Israel. The crisis ended due to international pressure on the three attacking nations. For further information, see: Majani, Wafaa, "The Tripartite Aggression against Egypt 1956," Master's Thesis, published, Mohamed Khider University, 2013, p. 19 et seq.

148 The Saudi National Guard: an internal security force recruited from various tribes loyal to the Al Saud family. Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 102.

149 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 102.

150 Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 621.

151 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 101.

152 Al-Oqab, *The Development of Yemeni-Saudi Relations*, p. 127.

provided to the royalists: "Friends, why do we help our brothers in Yemen? If we help some of them by providing food and other things to enable them to preserve their lives, is that considered assistance? We did not send fleets or planes and tanks to burn villages, homes, children, and the elderly. Nevertheless, we proposed that the principle of withdrawal of all foreign forces be approved. If that is done, then we are willing to reach an agreement to stop aid provided to Yemen from all sources and leave freedom to the Yemenis to determine their destiny and the type of rule they desire"¹⁵³.

After this speech, Prince Faisal clarified his explicit stance on Egyptian intervention and tried to spread awareness among the ranks of the Saudi people about the danger coming from the south of Saudi Arabia. In the speech, he also tried to emphasize the ability of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia without needing the support of the United States of America.

We conclude from the above that President Gamal Abdel Nasser wanted to withdraw his forces from Yemen, but as the victor withdrawing, not the defeated. After his forces incurred large financial and human losses, Saudi Arabia was not in a better condition than Egypt. Confrontation with Egypt was not one of Prince Faisal's choices. He viewed the Yemeni people as capable of determining their destiny and choosing the system that suits them, but that was impossible with the presence of foreign forces in Yemen.

At the first Arab summit conference of Arab kings and presidents in Cairo in mid-January 1964 within the framework of the Arab League, the Yemeni delegation participated in the summit represented by the republicans. The summit focused on the Palestinian issue, Israeli occupation and its aggressive attempts to divert the course of the Jordan River. The Yemeni delegation wanted to raise the Yemeni issue at the summit, but Prince Faisal refused to include the Yemeni crisis in the agenda. However, the Yemeni issue was discussed on the sidelines of the conference. The presence of the Yemeni delegation was considered a good step, as some Arab

states did not know the truth of what was happening in Yemen¹⁵⁴.

King Faisal bin Abdulaziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1964-1967 and His Role in the Yemeni Revolution 1964-1967

Talks occurred from time to time between Prince Faisal and President Abdel Nasser in an attempt to resolve the conflict in Yemen throughout 1964. President Abdel Nasser tried to strengthen his position through the advances and victories of the republican forces over the royalists, to enter negotiations stronger with Prince Faisal. Meanwhile, Prince Faisal - after consolidating his power internally - was ready to attempt to resolve the issue of the Egyptian presence in Yemen through negotiations¹⁵⁵. In September 1964, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Prince Faisal met at the Arab summit in Alexandria to reach a peaceful solution to the Yemeni crisis¹⁵⁶.

The Yemeni crisis imposed itself on all leaders at this summit. Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to be extremely flexible to reduce the severity of the disagreement. Both the Iraqi and Algerian governments played the role of mediator to resolve the Saudi-Egyptian dispute¹⁵⁷. They tried to convince the Saudi Kingdom to recognize the republican regime in Yemen, which would expedite the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen. They also requested Saudi Arabia to stop all aid provided to the royalists. This initiative resulted from the convening of the first Arab summit and an attempt to exploit the Saudi-Egyptian meeting¹⁵⁸.

Both leaders announced that they had reached an agreement regarding a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Yemen. On September 12, President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Prince Faisal met at the Alexandria conference¹⁵⁹. This was their first meeting after Faisal became King of Saudi Arabia¹⁶⁰. It was decided that a seven-month truce would take place, during which Egypt would begin withdrawing its forces, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would stop its support for the Imam's army. The Yemeni people were to form a transitional government¹⁶¹. The Saudi government

¹⁵³ Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, p. 93.

¹⁵⁴ Abu Lahoum, Sinan, *Yemen: Facts and Documents I Lived Through 1962-1974*, Vol. 2, Al-Afif Cultural Foundation, Sana'a, 1st ed., 2002, pp. 98-99. It will be later referred to as: Abu Lahoum, Yemen; Al-Janahi, *The National Movement*, pp. 255-256.

¹⁵⁵ Vasiliev, *King Faisal*, pp. 638-640

¹⁵⁶ Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 106; Abu Izz al-Din, Najib, *Twenty Years in the Service of Yemen*, Dar al-Bahith, Beirut, 1st ed., 1990, p. 202. It will be later referred to as: Abu Izz al-Din, *Twenty Years*.

¹⁵⁷ Abu Lahoum, *Yemen*, Vol. 2, p. 106; Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, p. 129.

¹⁵⁸ Al-Oqab, *The Unity of Yemen*, p. 47; Al-Janahi, *The National Movement*, p. 256; Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, pp. 129-130.

¹⁵⁹ Soviets, *Contemporary History of Yemen*, p. 152; Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, p. 130.

¹⁶⁰ Abu Zikra, *Flowers are Buried*, p. 138.

¹⁶¹ Vasiliev, *King Faisal*, pp. 638-640; Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 106.

announced that it was optimistic about the Arab summit to solve the Yemeni crisis. The meeting took place between President Gamal Abdel Nasser along with the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Abdel Hakim Amer, with Prince Faisal and the Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia¹⁶². The most prominent points agreed upon were¹⁶³:

1. The two states will make the necessary contacts and mediate with the concerned parties to create an atmosphere of understanding to reach a solution to existing differences through peaceful means, and these contacts will continue until those differences disappear and matters stabilize in Yemen.
2. The two sister states adhere to full cooperation between them in all affairs and various fields and announce each other's support in all circumstances politically, materially, and morally.

Peace attempts took a practical form at the Erkowit conference in Sudan on October 30, 1964, where both royalists and republicans met to reach a political settlement. It was planned that the Yemeni element would meet at this conference to agree on a ceasefire and arrange for a second conference in Haraz in northern Yemen in November 1964. Indeed, an agreement was reached on a ceasefire on the evening of November 7, 1964, then the date for the second conference was set in Haraz¹⁶⁴. After many communications, it was agreed that the conference location would be in Yemen¹⁶⁵ in Haradh¹⁶⁶.

However, the meeting in Haraz was not held, due to the outbreak of fighting again in November

1964¹⁶⁷, as the royalists began attacking the republicans to regain the areas they lost. The Alexandria treaty ended. After that, a meeting was held in Sudan, but it failed because the two parties did not want to take the first step to fulfill their role in this treaty. Each side wanted this treaty to be a diplomatic cover for withdrawal, and each of them was willing to abandon its ally, whether from the Hamid al-Din family or from the leaders of the revolutionaries, in order for the two parties to reach a political settlement¹⁶⁸.

Under these circumstances, the ongoing battles between the two parties continued, perhaps due to their disagreement on forming a transitional government that did not include any of the military republicans or princes from the Hamid al-Din family. No date was set for the withdrawal of Egyptian forces, nor was any decision made regarding conducting Yemeni elections¹⁶⁹. The Haraz conference was limited to leaders of the tribal feudal gathering¹⁷⁰.

During the peace conference held in the city of Khamr¹⁷¹ in Yemen on May 2, 1965, Prime Minister al-Nu'man¹⁷² affirmed the reorganization of relations with Egypt and the necessity of striving to reduce tension with Saudi Arabia. Al-Nu'man also denounced the foreign forces supporting the royalists and requested Jordan, Syria, and Kuwait to play the role of mediator in reducing tension and explained to them his desire for a peaceful settlement with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia¹⁷³. He sent a telegram on May 10, 1965, to King Faisal requesting him to exert his utmost effort to reach a permanent

162 Al-Difaa, Jerusalem, No. 8704, September 13, 1964, p. 1.

163 National House, Revolution and Peace, p. 200; Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict, p. 130.

164 Haraz: This is a large district whose main center is Manakhah, located on the road between Sana'a and Hodeidah. It is a city of moderate commercial importance, and al-Hamdani described it as "Haraz al-Mustahrizah," meaning impregnable and fortified. It contains a large number of towering mountains. For more information on the Haraz region, see: Afif, The Yemeni Encyclopedia, pp. 1053-1054.

165 Joyce, Past and Present, p. 106; National House, Revolution and Peace, pp. 200-202; Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict, p. 130; Soviets, Contemporary History of Yemen, p. 152; Al-Hadidi, Witness, p. 117.

166 Haradh: A city and valley in the northwest of Hajjah and east of the port of Midi on the Red Sea coast, about 30 km away, and near the northern border with Saudi Arabia. Its name is attributed to Haradh ibn Khawlan ibn Amr ibn Himyar. It is an ancient city formerly known as Wadi Abdullah, and it was the site of a peace conference between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and King Faisal Al Saud on August 24th. For more information on the Haradh region, see: Afif, The Yemeni Encyclopedia, pp. 1055-1056.

167 Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict, p. 130.

168 Joyce, Past and Present, pp. 106-107.

169 Joyce, Past and Present, pp. 106-107.

170 Soviets, Contemporary History of Yemen, p. 153.

171 For more information on the Khamr Conference, see: National House, Revolution and Peace, pp. 202-203.

172 Al-Nu'man (1909-1996): Professor Ahmad Muhammad Nu'man was a scholar and politician born in the village of Al-Jubana on April 26, 1909. He founded a school in his village in 1931 and taught there. He served as the Director of Education for the Taiz Governorate during the reign of Imam Yahya. He attempted to persuade Imam Ahmad, during his reign, to develop Taiz and make it a model of beneficial progress. He then became the director and teacher of the Hajjah School and the supervisor of education in Hajjah. Later, he served as an advisor to Imam Ahmad on education. Following the 1962 revolution, he became Prime Minister on April 20, 1965, but resigned on July 2, 1965, under pressure from President Gamal Abdel Nasser. For more information on Al-Nu'man, see: Afif, The Yemeni Encyclopedia, pp. 2989-3002.

173 Soviets, Contemporary History of Yemen, p. 155.

peace in Yemen¹⁷⁴. King Faisal replied that he was keen on the security and stability of Yemen through the agreement of all parties¹⁷⁵.

On May 26, 1965, a conference of Arab foreign ministers was held in Cairo. An attempt was made to include the topic of the Yemeni crisis on the agenda, but Saudi Arabia rejected that because Gamal Abdel Nasser would be the controller in such meetings. King Faisal expressed his desire to meet a popular delegation from Yemen consisting of representatives from all Yemeni parties. Al-Nu'man accepted King Faisal's proposal¹⁷⁶.

Subsequently, al-Nu'man formed a delegation of Yemeni politicians to meet King Faisal, noting that the delegation was formed without coordination with Yemeni President Abdullah al-Sallal and the Egyptian government. Therefore, al-Sallal and the Egyptian leadership were angered, which pushed al-Nu'man to submit his resignation on July 2, 1965, and a new government was formed¹⁷⁷.

It is mentioned that some Yemeni officers objected to the continuing Egyptian interventions in Yemen, and this gave a golden opportunity to King Faisal to intervene and thus split their ranks. Therefore, he provided them with financial and political support. This also coincided with the emergence of many tribes that opposed the Egyptian presence and continuous intervention in Yemen, forming what was known as the Third Force, a political organization that was neither royalist nor republican, declaring that an Islamic government was the only way to end the civil war in Yemen. This organization developed rapidly and managed to hold talks with the republican camp. The Saudis encouraged this movement, and it had an office in Riyadh. Faisal also pressured the royalists to integrate this organization into their ranks¹⁷⁸.

King Faisal was trying to build a counter-force to the Egyptian presence in northern Yemen. He arranged for a meeting in Taif between dissident republicans, elements of the Third Force, and the royalists¹⁷⁹. To win over the republican side, no one from the Hamid al-Din family was invited¹⁸⁰.

On July 26, 1965, King Faisal met with a Yemeni delegation in Taif. He presented to them what the

Hamid al-Din family had done before the revolution, and they affirmed that the conflict in Yemen was because of them. King Faisal's response was that what harms Yemen harms Saudi Arabia, and he affirmed the security and stability of Yemen. The Yemeni delegation drafted a memorandum to King Faisal emphasizing the necessity of excluding the house of Hamid al-Din from ruling Yemen. On August 10, 1965, the Taif Document was signed. King Faisal forced the royalists to sign it, and it affirmed that there was no solution to the Yemeni crisis except through a transitional government¹⁸¹.

The meeting parties, composed of most segments of the Yemeni people and its tribes, agreed and pledged to God the principles signed in Taif¹⁸²:

1. Supporting God's religion, exalting His word, and adhering to Sharia teachings.
2. Placing Yemen's interest and the unity of its territories above all considerations.
3. Cooperating with sincere intention and sincere determination to stop the tragedy that Yemen is living through, and finding solutions to unify the efforts of the Yemeni people to preserve the country's security and safety.
4. The attendees pledge before God that none of them, nor those they represent, will carry weapons with the intent of aggression and conspiracy against each other.
5. Forgetting the distant and recent past with its pains, sorrows, evils, and sins, and abandoning the grudges left by the years, so that dear Yemen - dear to all our hearts - may enjoy a unified, cohesive people dominated by the spirit of affection and brotherhood, capable of building its future and advancing its country with the help of its Arab sisters to the heights of glory, progress, and advancement.
6. Providing the opportunity for the Yemeni people to declare their free will in determining their destiny by choosing the ruling system that satisfies them, away from all external influences, especially after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the United Arab Republic and the cessation of Saudi aid.

The transitional period was built on the following

174 Al-Janahi, *The National Movement*, 286.

175 Al-Oqab, *The Development of Yemeni-Saudi Relations*, pp. 153-155.

176 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 109.

177 Al-Oqab, *The Development of Yemeni-Saudi Relations*, p. 155.

178 Joyce, *Past and Present*, pp. 109-110; Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 670.

179 Al-Janahi, *The National Movement*, p. 283.

180 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 110.

181 Abu Lahoum, *Yemen*, Vol. 2, pp. 140-145.

182 Al-Eryabi, Abd al-Rahman ibn Yahya, *Memoirs of President Judge Abd al-Rahim ibn Yahya 1962-1967*, Vol. 2, Egyptian General Printing Press, Egypt, 1st ed., 2013, p. 358. It will be later referred to as: Al-Eryabi, *Memoirs*; Abu Izz al-Din, *Twenty Years*, pp. 203-204.

foundations:

1. Establishing the State of Yemen under the name of the Islamic State of Yemen, based on the noble Islamic Sharia rulings. The affairs of this state will be managed temporarily by:
 - a. A State Council that undertakes the powers of the head of state, consisting of seven to eight members representing all spectra of the Yemeni people.
 - b. A Ministerial Council that undertakes the powers of the executive authority, consisting of twenty-four to twenty-eight ministers, representing the conscious elements from various segments of Yemen.
 - c. A Consultative Council that directs and supervises the work of the Council of Ministers and assists it in managing its task, consisting of eighty members representing all Yemeni segments.
2. The task of these temporary governmental bodies is¹⁸³:
 - a. Consolidating internal security and supervising the withdrawal of Egyptian forces and the cessation of Saudi aid.
 - b. Preparing to conduct a general referendum in Yemen from which the determination of the basic system of rule will emerge.

The attendees called on all their brothers in Yemen, despite their different tendencies and principles, to unite to get Yemen out of the crisis it is suffering from through the previous principles. The meeting parties will also cooperate to achieve those principles. They will also attempt to obtain financial aid that will be provided by Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and all Arab states in the Arab League, in order to build a strong and developed Yemeni state¹⁸⁴. On August 12, 1965, the Taif Document was officially announced¹⁸⁵.

During this period, the Saudi stance began to lean towards reconciliation and ending the crisis in any form. We observe through the Taif conference sponsored by King Faisal that he did not put forward his ideas or interfere, but remained neutral, working to bring viewpoints closer and insisting on reaching a solution. Here began the features of King Faisal's abandonment of the Hamid al-Din family, affirming that the Hamid al-Din family would be excluded

from rule and that their return to Yemen was absolutely not possible, otherwise the Egyptian forces would remain in it and on its territory. Saudi Arabia also allocated a monthly stipend for the members of the Yemeni delegation, which clarifies the Saudi change and that it had begun to lean towards the republicans on condition of their departure from subordination to the Egyptian government.

On August 18, 1965, the Saudi government issued several encouraging statements for Yemen, made by many senior Saudi officials, foremost among them King Faisal, who expressed his desire to hold talks with President Gamal Abdel Nasser in an attempt to reach a solution to the Yemeni crisis. The Saudi Minister of Defense stated that he hoped the communications between the Kingdom and the Republic would lead to a prompt solution to the Yemeni crisis. The Saudi Minister of Interior stated that there would be a meeting between King Faisal and Gamal Abdel Nasser soon, and affirmed that it was possible to solve the Yemeni problem within a short period, and that the endeavors between the two states must end well¹⁸⁶.

King Faisal had called the Saudi Council of Ministers to an emergency session to prepare for President Gamal Abdel Nasser's visit to Saudi Arabia. The King held this meeting before moving to Jeddah. Preparations were made there in the royal palace to receive the Egyptian president. Mecca radio announced the statement issued by the Saudi Royal Diwan regarding the timing of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's arrival to Saudi Arabia, and that he would arrive at Jeddah port on the morning of Sunday, August 20, 1965¹⁸⁷.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser headed on an official visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia via the Red Sea¹⁸⁸, where he was received by King Faisal at Jeddah port¹⁸⁹. There was a massive public reception¹⁹⁰. All Yemenis were evacuated from Jeddah, under the pretext of preserving security, but the main goal was to prevent any sheikhs of the dissident tribal delegations from meeting with Gamal Abdel Nasser¹⁹¹.

During President Gamal Abdel Nasser's visit, he

183 Al-Eryabi, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, p. 395; Abu Lahoum, *Yemen*, Vol. 2, pp. 145-146.

184 Al-Eryabi, *Memoirs*, pp. 359-360

185 Abu Lahoum, *Yemen*, Vol. 2, p. 106.

186 National House, *Revolution and Peace*, pp. 206-207.

187 National House, *Revolution and Peace*, pp. 207-210-211; Al-Jihad, *Jerusalem*, No. 3713, August 21, 1965, p. 2.

188 Al-Jihad, *Jerusalem*, No. 3713, August 21, 1965, p. 1.

189 Al-Madinah, *Al-Madinah Al-Munawwarah*, No. 445, August 22, 1965, p. 1; Okaz, *Jeddah*, No. 254, August 22, 1965, p. 1.

190 Rida, Adel, *An Attempt to Understand the Yemeni Revolution*, Modern Egypt Library, Egypt, 1st Edition, 1974, pp. 90-91. It will be later referred to as: Rida, *An Attempt to Understand the Yemeni Revolution*.

191 Al-Eryabi, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, p. 270.

met with King Faisal, and during the meeting, they discussed Yemen and the disturbed conditions there¹⁹². After two days of negotiations between the two parties, lasting from August 22-24, 1965, the two sides reached an agreement to conclude the Jeddah Agreement on August 24 to end the war in Yemen. The agreement included a ceasefire, the establishment of a neutral government, and working towards a general referendum by a date no later than November 23, 1966, to determine Yemen's constitutional status. It was agreed to agree on executive details at a settlement meeting between the different Yemeni parties and trends in Harad on November 23, 1965. It affirmed the agreement to withdraw Egyptian forces from Yemen by a date no later than September 1965, in return for stopping Saudi aid to the royalists, preventing the use of Saudi territory in any military operations against Yemen, and stopping armed clashes between the two sides, all within ten months¹⁹³. It also included determining the method of rule during a transitional period until a popular referendum was held¹⁹⁴, and forming a joint Saudi-Egyptian force called the Peace Force¹⁹⁵. The Peace Force managed to liberate (42) prisoners from the Jizan and Najran areas¹⁹⁶.

The two sides also secretly agreed that each would abandon its ally (Egypt abandoning al-Sallal, and Saudi Arabia abandoning the Hamid al-Din family) in favor of a Yemeni settlement¹⁹⁷. King Faisal told al-Nu'man frankly that he would not accept a ruler in Yemen who did not align with Saudi interests¹⁹⁸. The treaty was signed on August 24, and it worked to restore relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia to their normal state after they had been strained due to the Yemeni issue¹⁹⁹.

Initially, the two parties adhered to the Jeddah Agreement, and preparations began for a new

conference in Harad. Saudi Arabia cut off the aid it had been providing to the Imam's army. No member of the Hamid al-Din family was invited to the conference planned to be held between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and a group of segments of the Yemeni people. Talks took place during the period December 23-25, 1965, but they ended in failure²⁰⁰.

The Saudi government sought to conclude a military deal with the United States and Britain worth 350 million dollars in December 1965, in order to form an air defense system capable of repelling any air attack by the Egyptian air force on Saudi Arabia²⁰¹.

King Faisal sought during December 1965 to carry out a series of official visits including Iran, Jordan, and a number of Islamic states. King Faisal proposed to the leaders and figures he met with to hold an Islamic conference in Mecca at that time. However, President Gamal Abdel Nasser opposed the idea of holding such a conference, believing that Faisal's call to hold an Islamic conference was a practical response to confront his socialist ideas and his revolutionary and nationalist concepts, which the Saudis saw as contradicting Islamic creed²⁰².

King Faisal, in turn, denied that his invitation to hold a conference was directed against President Gamal Abdel Nasser because he is a Muslim and among Muslim leaders, and any Islamic invitation cannot be directed against any Muslim. If President Abdel Nasser believes that the purpose of this invitation is to isolate him, he is mistaken. King Faisal also responded to the Egyptian claims that the Kingdom followed a policy of patience and tolerance so that a clash would not occur between it and any Arab state, and that it had referred the issue of Egyptian attacks on Saudi territory to the Secretary-General of the United Nations²⁰³.

192 Al-Jihad, Jerusalem, No. 3714, August 22, 1965, p. 1; Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 669.

193 Al-Ghuwayyin, Faisal Khalil, *The Political History of Jordanian-Egyptian Relations 1945-1970*, Dar Al-Manzuma, Jordan, 2008, p. 279. It will be later referred to as: Al-Ghuwayyin, *Political History*; National House, *Revolution and Peace*, pp. 227-233; Al-Eryabi, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, pp. 270-271; Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 111; Abu Lahoum, Vol. 2, Yemen, pp. 150-153; Al-Oqab, *The Unity of Yemen*, pp. 47-48; Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, pp. 132-133; Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 669; Abu Izz al-Din, *Twenty Years*, pp. 205-206.

194 National House, *Revolution and Peace*, p. 310; Rida, *The Yemeni Revolution*, pp. 89-90; Al-Thawr, *The Yemeni Revolution*, pp. 176-177; Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation*, p. 669.

195 Abu Zikra, *Flowers are Buried*, p. 140; Abu Izz al-Din, *Twenty Years*, pp. 205-206.

196 Abu Zikra, *Flowers are Buried*, p. 140.

197 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 111; Abu Zikra, *Flowers are Buried*, p. 57.

198 Abu Lahoum, *Yemen*, Vol. 2, p. 124.

199 Rida, *The Yemeni Revolution*, p. 88.

200 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 111; Abu Lahoum, *Yemen*, Vol. 2, pp. 165-169; Badeeb, *The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict*, p. 133; Al-Janahi, *The National Movement*, pp. 296-297.

201 Al-Fariji, Fatima Muhammad, *Saudi-Egyptian Relations during the reign of King Faisal bin Abdulaziz 1384-1395 AH/1964-1975 AD: A Study in Political Relations*, King Abdulaziz House - Saudi Arabia, 1st edition, 2013 AD, p. 90. It will be later referred to as: Al-Fariji, *Saudi-Egyptian Relations*.

202 Al-Fariji, *Saudi-Egyptian Relations*, p. 90.

203 Al-Fariji, *Saudi-Egyptian Relations*, pp. 91-92.

In August 1966, King Faisal invited members of the Hamid al-Din family to Taif to consult in light of the repeated Egyptian aggressions. They tried to convince King Faisal to carry out a wide and violent attack against the Egyptians. Faisal's response was refusal, and a major rift began between King Faisal and the members of the Hamid al-Din family. He then ordered the cutting of aid to them, then turned to the Third Force to approach them and win over the dissident republicans. In March 1967, members of the Hamid al-Din family and their supporters acted against King Faisal's support for the Third Force and the dissident republicans²⁰⁴.

After Egypt's defeat in the June (1967) War²⁰⁵, the Egyptian role in Yemen diminished. Egypt became preoccupied with confronting Israel, which had occupied the Sinai Peninsula, and was no longer able to give Yemen sufficient importance. Following the June 1967 War, King Faisal issued a declaration of mobilization and alert for all Saudi armed forces and canceled all leaves for members of the armed forces to support the Arabs against Israel²⁰⁶.

When King Faisal was asked in an interview: Is it possible for him to meet with Gamal Abdel Nasser? He replied that he could never refuse to meet any of the Arab rulers. He also sent to Gamal Abdel Nasser affirming his stand by Egypt and all Arab states confronting Israel. At the beginning of December 1966, the Sudanese government took the initiative to intervene as a mediator to end the Yemeni crisis, but Abdel Nasser opposed any agreement regarding Yemen. However, the Egyptian position soon changed and began seeking a settlement to end the Yemeni crisis²⁰⁷. In early August 1967, a meeting was held between the foreign ministers of those states in Sudan. During the meeting, the Egyptian Foreign Minister presented an initiative to settle the Yemeni crisis. The initiative included returning to the Jeddah Agreement. The Saudi Foreign Minister commented that Saudi Arabia was ready to solve the Yemeni

problem based on two principles: first, non-interference in Yemen's affairs by any Arab or non-Arab state, and that Saudi Arabia would stop financial support after the withdrawal of Egyptian forces; second, that the Yemeni people decide the solution that suits them²⁰⁸.

On August 20, 1967, the Sudanese Prime Minister met with King Faisal, and on August 23, he met with Gamal Abdel Nasser. On August 29 and 31, 1967, the two parties reached an agreement to solve the Yemeni problem, known as the Khartoum Agreement²⁰⁹. During the meeting, the Egyptian president affirmed his fears of the Hamid al-Din family returning to power. King Faisal's response was that this matter was absolutely not possible²¹⁰. Faisal said: "Dear Gamal... the Hamid al-Din family has been my enemy for forty years, and it is not your enemy"²¹¹.

King Faisal wanted to reassure Gamal Abdel Nasser that he was not seeking to restore the Hamid al-Din family to the throne, that he had provided aid to the royalists as a natural reaction to the Egyptian military presence on Yemeni territory, and that Saudi Arabia had no interest in helping the royalists in Yemen. They discussed the details of the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen. Abdel Nasser requested Saudi assistance to transport soldiers and equipment. Faisal replied that he had no ships and told Abdel Nasser to agree with any shipping company and that Saudi Arabia would pay all costs. Faisal affirmed that no one's properties in Yemen had been confiscated²¹². On October 6, 1967, news was broadcast that Egyptian forces would leave Yemen within ten days, and on October 9, the withdrawal of Egyptian forces began²¹³. The last Egyptian soldier left Yemeni territory at the beginning of December 1967²¹⁴.

CONCLUSION

Saudi Arabia stood by the Hamid al-Din family

204 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 115.

205 The June War: This war took place between Egypt, Jordan, and Syria against the Israeli occupation on June 5, 1967. It lasted six days and ended with the defeat of the Arab forces, resulting in the loss of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, the Golan Heights to Syria, and the West Bank to Jordan. For more information on the June War of 1967, see: Al-Shihabi, *Six Days of the June 1967 War and the Making of a New Middle East*, Al-Obaikan Library, Riyadh, 1st edition, 2005.

206 Al-Farjii, *Saudi-Egyptian Relations*, pp. 105-106. Al-Oqab, *The Development of Yemeni-Saudi Relations*, p. 197; Al-Oqab, *The Unity of Yemen*, p. 108.

207 Al-Farjii, *Saudi-Egyptian Relations*, pp. 106-109.

208 Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation and the Yemeni Revolution*, pp. 725-727.

209 Al-Baydani, *The Crisis of the Arab Nation and the Revolution of Yemen*, p. 727; Al-Oqab, *The Unity of Yemen*, p. 108.

210 Al-Farjii, *Saudi-Egyptian Relations*, p. 111; Al-Oqab, *The Development of Yemeni-Saudi Relations*, p. 199; Al-Eryabi, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, pp. 581-582.

211 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 116.

212 Fatima, *Saudi-Egyptian Relations*, p. 111; Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 116.

213 Abu Lahoum, *Yemen*, Vol. 2, p. 251.

214 Joyce, *Past and Present*, p. 116.

after the Treaty of Taif, and Saudi Arabia supported it against any opponents, as was evident in the revolutions of 1948 and 1955. This support was due to Yemen's geographical importance, as any change in the ruling system or succession could spread into Saudi Arabia. In the 1962 revolution, it was expected that Saudi Arabia would continue to support the Zaydi system, as it stood by the Hamid al-Din family from the first days of the revolution's outbreak. King Saud's main goal in supporting the revolution was to restore them to the throne. However, Saudi policy changed after Prince Faisal took over the Yemeni crisis file, as he tried to attract major and Arab states to stand by Saudi Arabia against the new regime. Egyptian military intervention had a great impact in increasing Saudi support for the royalists. However, he failed to attract the United States and found in Jordan and Britain an ally for him.

Prince Faisal viewed the Yemeni crisis differently from King Saud. The Prince was not inclined towards the Zaydi system due to the contradiction of Zaydi thought with Wahhabism. Saudi policy began to use Zaydism, or the royalists, as a pressure tool to secure the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen. Prince Faisal viewed Egyptian intervention in Yemen as a cover to increase Egyptian influence in the

Arabian Peninsula.

The Saudi government resorted to holding many conferences to end the Yemeni crisis. The basic condition for stopping Saudi support was the complete withdrawal of Egyptian forces. In the end, the June 1967 War played a major role that forced the Egyptian leadership to accept leaving Yemen. Egypt's condition for withdrawal was the non-return of the Hamid al-Din family to power. King Faisal accepted that condition, as he did not view the Hamid al-Din family as an ally but as a pressure card to strengthen his position in negotiations.

The Saudi government affirmed that it did not carry out military intervention or even think about it, to preserve the security and stability of Yemen. It always sought not to provoke the Egyptian forces, even though it received many attacks on its border cities, and did not respond to the attacks it was subjected to by Egyptian forces. It preferred to go to the United Nations to solve that problem. Also, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of King Faisal, may God have mercy on him, was keen to solve the Yemeni problem in a way that achieves the desire and will of the Yemeni people and their sovereignty over their land.

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